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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KAREN MAAS 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case # 981654-CA 
Priority # 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This case was tried before a jury in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah. Defendant 
was found guilty of Falsely signing Evidence of Financial Card 
Transaction, a third-degree felony; Unlawful use of Financial 
Transaction, a class B misdemeanor; and Property Obtained by 
Unlawful Financial Transaction Card Conduct, a class B 
misdemeanor. Appellant appeals from this decision. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78-2A-3(E) (1953), as amended. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Defendant was denied a fair trial because her post-
Miranda silence was used against her. 
Standard of Review. Whether use of post-Miranda silence 
against defendant is harmful error is a mixed question of fact 
and law reviewed with some deference to the trial Court. State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
The issue was preserved during the course of the trial. (Tr. 
at pp. 47-49). Although Defense counsel failed to object to the 
prosecutor's reference to Defendant's silence during closing and 
during the viewing of the video, nonetheless, this failure is not 
fatal to Defendant's appeal. In State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293 
(Utah App. 1997), no objection or request for a curative 
instruction was made by defense, but since it was plain error to 
fail to object, this Court still addressed this issue on appeal 
and reversed the trial Court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the Fall of 1997, the defendant, Karen Maas worked at 
the Alco Department Store in Moab, Utah. On December 14, 1997, a 
customer came into the store and made a purchase which he charged 
to his credit card. (R005) The Alco records indicate that this 
charge was made to a register that Ms. Maas was working that 
evening.(R005) 
Approximately 3 0 minutes after this customer made his 
purchase, a second purchase was also made on his credit card 
account. (R005) This second purchase was also rung through the 
register to which Ms. Maas was assigned that evening. (005) When 
this customer received his credit card bill, he contacted Alco to 
dispute the second charge claiming that he had not been the one 
who made this second purchase. (R004-005) The second purchase was 
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an American Camper brand camping set which included four sleeping 
bags, a tent, a campstove, a lantern, a picnic set, a flashlight, 
and a first aid kit. (R005) According to Ms. Maas, the person who 
purchased this large camping set later tried to return it to the 
store for cash, but was unable to as store policy did not allow 
for a cash return on a credit card purchase. (Tr. at p.69) Ms. 
Maas, however, offered to buy the items herself. She didn't have 
any money with her to make this purchase, so she gave this 
customer her home address asking him to bring this camping set to 
her home so she could purchase it from him later that evening. 
(Tr. at p. 71-72) Some time later, Ms. Maas needed money, so she 
pawned this camping set. (Tr. at p. 74) She did not take this 
camping set to a pawnshop out of the area, but instead took it 
directly to a local shop where she pawned it in her own name. 
Ms. Maas was aware that police routinely check pawn shops for 
stolen items. (Tr. at p. 75) 
After the credit card holder contacted the store regarding 
his dispute to the charge on his account, the police were 
contacted and Ms. Maas was confronted by Officer Neil, a local 
Sheriff regarding this matter. (Tr. at p. 48; 76-77) After a 
brief conversation with this officer, Ms. Maas decided to invoke 
her right to silence and not speak with this officer regarding 
this matter. (Tr. at p. 48; 77) Ms. Maas was later arrested and 
charged with Falsely signing Evidence of Financial Card 
Transaction, a third-degree felony; Unlawful use of Financial 
•o-
Transaction, a class B misdemeanor; and Property Obtained by 
Unlawful Financial Transaction Card Conduct, a class B 
misdemeanor. 
During the trial, Officer Neil testified that Ms. Maas had 
refused to speak to him after being read her Miranda rights. (Tr. 
at p.48) Defense counsel attempted to prevent this evidence from 
coming in, but was unable to do so. Ms. Maas testified as to 
her version of what had occurred. (Tr. at pp. 66-82) The credit 
card holder testified that he did not make the second purchase. 
(Tr. at p. 15) A friend of Ms. Maas testified that he had been 
home on the evening that she received the camping set at her 
home. (Tr. at pp. 59-60) Ms. Maas' friend testified that a man 
brought the camp set to Karen's home to sell it to her. (Tr. at 
pp. 59-60) No one testified that they saw Ms. Maas commit this 
1
 The following colloquy took place in a Bench Conference prior to Officer Neil's 
testimony: 
MR. SHULTZ: I'm going to make an objection to any questions about whether or 
not he attempted to interview Ms. Maas. Ms. Maas refused to talk to him, she 
declined to talk to him, and I think that would be an improper comment in 
exercising her Fifth Amendment right now at this time. She didn't exercise her 
Fifth Amendment right, but she did refuse to talk to Deputy - -
MR. BENGE: Well, the comment she made before refusing to comment is, I 
think, the way she - -
THE COURT: What did she say? 
MR. BENGE: She said, Well, you have everything out, I don't have anything else 
to say. 
THE COURT: I think I'll let that in. 
MR. SCHULTZ: We're on the record. My objection went on the record? 
THE COURT: Yes, I think so. 
(Tr. at pp. 47) 
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crime or leave the store with this camping equipment. (Tr. at pp. 
4-82) Consequently, all of the evidence against the defendant was 
circumstantial as was conceded by the State during opening 
argument. (Tr. at p. 8) 
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Ms. Maas 
was a liar and stated, "In order for you to believe the 
defendant's story. . .You would have to disregard that when Kim 
Neil went to the defendant's house, showed her the evidence, 
asked if she had anything to say about it she said 'No, you have 
everything, anyway.' " (Tr. at p. 111-112) 
During deliberation, the jury requested that they be allowed 
to review the transcript of Officer Neil's testimony and that of 
another witness for the State. (Tr. at pp. 112-113; 115) The 
Court replayed for the jury the video tape of Officer Neil's 
testimony and again, the jury heard Officer Neil testify that Ms. 
Maas refused to speak to him after being informed of her right to 
remain silent. (Tr. at p. 77) Defense counsel made no objection 
to this. 
Shortly after reviewing the testimony of these two 
prosecution witnesses, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on 
all counts. (Tr. at p. 116; R101-103) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case involves the State's use of defendant, Ms. Maas' 
post-Miranda silence at trial. Here the state improperly used 
Ms. Maas' silence against her and this error was harmful. 
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The United States Supreme Court has held that, under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
prosecution may not use a defendant's post-Miranda 
silence for impeachment purposes. .See Doyle v\ Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 
(1976) . Similarly, the prosecution may not use a 
defendant's post-Miranda silence as substantive 
evidence of guilt. See United States v. Tenorio, 69 
F.3d 1103, 1106 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Wainwright v. 
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295, 106 S.CT. 634, 640-41, 
88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986)). The prosecution's use of post-
Miranda silence " 'prejudice[s] the defendant by 
attempting to create an inference of guilt in the 
jury's mind.' " United States v. Newman, 943 F.2d 
1155, 1157 (9 Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. 
Wyeoff, 545 F.2d 679, 681 (9tq Cir 1976).2 
State v. Byrd. 937 P.2d 532, 534 (Utah App. 1997) 
State and Federal case law support Ms. Maas ' position that 
the error which occurred in allowing her post-Miranda silence to 
be used against her was harmful and a new trial is warranted. 
State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah App. 1997); Velarde 
v. Shulsen. 757 F.2d 1093 (10th Circuit 1985); State v. Byrd, 937 
P.2d 532, 534 (Utah App. 1997). 
Here the State used Ms. Maas' silence to suggest that she 
was a liar. The jury was exposed to three references to her 
post-Miranda silence and no curative instruction was given. 
Because this case comes down to a credibility contest between Ms. 
2
 See also State v. Saunders, 98 0hioApp.3d 355, 648 N.E.2d 
587, 590 (1994) (noting effect of prosecutor's comment was to 
suggest guilt of defendant, "because an innocent person would not 
have remained silent."). 
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Maas' account of what happened and the State's request that the 
jury infer her guilt from purely circumstantial evidence, the 
error of allowing in this testimony was harmful and requires 
reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROSECUTION'S USE OF DEFENDANT'S POST-MIRANDA 
SILENCE WAS HARMFUL ERROR. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that, under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
prosecution may not use a defendant's post-Miranda 
silence for impeachment purposes. See Doyle v. Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 
(1976) . Similarly, the prosecution may not use a 
defendant's post-Miranda silence as substantive 
evidence of guilt. See United States v. Tenorio, 69 
F.3d 1103, 1106 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Wainwright v. 
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295, 106 S.CT. 634, 640-41, 
88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986)). The prosecution's use of post-
Miranda silence " 'prejudice[s] the defendant by 
attempting to create an inference of guilt in the 
jury's mind.' " United States v. Newman, 943 F.2d 
1155, 1157 (9" Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. 
Wyeoff, 545 F.2d 679, 681 (9"n Cir 1976).3 
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 534 (Utah App. 1997) 
The basic principle behind Doyle is the fundamental 
unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that his silence will 
3
 See also State v. Saunders, 98 0hioApp.3d 355, 648 N.E.2d 
587, 590 (1994) (noting effect of prosecutor's comment was to 
suggest guilt of defendant, "because an innocent person would not 
have remained silent."). 
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not be used against him and then using his silence to impeach an 
explanation subsequently offered at trial. State v. Harmon. 956 
P.2d 262, 267 (Utah 1998) discussing Doyle v. Ohio. 426 U.S. 610; 
96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245; 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). 
The mere mention that a defendant invoked his Constitutional 
rights does not prima facie establish a due process violation. 
Id. at 268. If, however, the State in some way uses the 
defendant's silence to undermine the exercise of those rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, a Doyle violation has 
occurred. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 267 (Utah 1998) 
discussing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610; 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245; 49 
L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). 
If such constitutional error does occur, the State bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the improperly elicited testimony 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt State v. Morrison, 93 7 
P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah App. 1997). Reversal will result whenever 
the State cannot show that the error was not harmful. Velarde v. 
Shulsen, 757 F.2d 1093 (10th Circuit 1985) In evaluating whether 
an evidentiary error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
court will focus on whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction. Morrison at 1296. 
In determining whether the evidence was harmful, the 
Morrison Court considered the following factors as established in 
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State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 1993) : 
. . ."(1) whether the jury would 'naturally and 
necessarily construe' the comment as referring to 
defendant's silence; (2) whether there was overwhelming 
evidence of defendant's guilt; (3) whether the evidence 
was isolated; and (4) whether the trial Court 
instructed the jury not to draw any adverse presumption 
from defendant's decision not to testify." 
Morrison at 1296-97. 
Defendant Morrison was arrested and convicted of possession 
of a controlled substance and possession of a weapon by a 
restricted person. This arrest took place in his own home in his 
bedroom. A handgun was found in a drawer that contained 
Morrison's personal items. Morrison declined to speak to police 
after his girlfriend called her attorney and was instructed that 
neither she nor he should make a statement. At trial, Morrison's 
girlfriend claimed responsibility for the drugs and Morrison's 
father took responsibility for the gun. The prosecutor 
questioned both defendant and his girlfriend about the fact that 
they would not speak to police. Defense counsel made no 
objection to this. The defendant was convicted and he appealed. 
This Court found that even though defense counsel failed to 
object to the prosecutors questions that the trial Court 
committed plain error by allowing the improper testimony into 
evidence. This Court then undertook to determine whether the 
error prejudiced the defendant. Applying the "-Reyes factors," 
this Court first considered whether the jury would naturally and 
necessarily construe the comments as referring to the defendant's 
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silence and found that the "clear implication of the testimonies 
was that Morrison might have given incriminating information," 
but for his girlfriend's entreaty to remain silent. Id. Next 
this Court considered the fact that the improper references were 
not isolated in that they occurred twice in a one-and-a-half day 
trial. Moreover, the Court noted that greater significance would 
attach to improper evidence of defendant's post-arrest silence 
because the trial was relatively short taking only a day and a 
half. Additionally, the trial court gave no curative 
instruction--a factor weighing against harmless error. 
Accordingly, the court found: 
. . . the sole Reyes factor the State may rely on to 
establish harmless error is whether the evidence of 
Morrison's guilt was overwhelming. In determining 
whether the evidence was so overwhelming as to overcome 
the constitutional error in this case, we examine both 
the amount of evidence indicating guilt as well and the 
nature of the State's case and of the defendant's 
defense. For instance, we may consider: (1) whether 
the State's case is based on circumstantial rather than 
direct evidence; (2) the plausibility of any 
exculpatory explanation for the set of circumstances 
leading to the charges; (3) whether the case depends 
primarily on the resolution of conflicting evidence 
consisting of uncorroborated and conflicting 
testimonies; and (4) the extent to which the defense 
rested on the defendant's credibility. 
State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1296-97 (Utah App. 
1997) See Velarde, 757 F.2d at 1095; Byrd, 937 P.2d at 
536-37. 
While the Morrison Court agreed that the evidence against 
the defendant was fairly strong, it was nevertheless mostly 
-10-
circumstantial. Defendant's explanation, although unlikely, was 
not implausible. Thus, the defendant's exculpatory explanation 
was crucial and the case turned in large part on his credibility. 
As such, the Court was not convinced that the evidence of 
Morrison's guilt was overwhelming and reversed his conviction. 
In State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532 (Utah App. 1997), the Court 
again considered this issue and reversed where defendant's post-
Miranda silence was used against him at trial. Here, the State 
made two references to the defendant's post-Miranda silence. 
First, the prosecutor elicited the testimony from the officer 
where he stated as follows: 
A. I advised this person, or the defendant, of his 
rights. I went through the four steps that are 
necessary, asked him if he would talk to me. He 
agreed, whcih was a waiver of his rights. And then 
proceeded to talk to the defendant. 
Q. Then what happened? 
A. Do you want me to go through the discussions? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Okay. I first off told the defendant that I had 
him on tape buying drugs at Pioneer Park. 
Q. What did the defendant say as to that? 
A. He didn't say anything. He didn't move his head. 
Byrd at 535. 
Later, on cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor 
used defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach his earlier 
exculpatory testimony. 
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Q. [Prosecutor] : You talked to the officer after he 
had advised you of your Miranda warnings? 
A. [Defendant]: No, I didn't. 
Q. Do you remember him giving you the Miranda 
warnings? 
A. I can't remember if he did or not. 
Q. So it could have been or it could not have been; 
that's what you are saying? 
A. I just know. . .1 didn't talk to him. 
Q. You certainly did not say anything to him about the 
driver buying these drugs, did you? 
A. I didn't say anything about no drugs, period. 
Id. at 535. 
Based upon this line of questioning and the answers 
elicited, this Court found that the prosecution was "clearly" 
trying to use the defendant's post-Miranda silence against him to 
impeach his testimony at trial. This Court stated as follows: 
. . .because "virtually any description of defendant's 
silence following arrest and Miranda warning will 
constitute a Doyle violation," United States v. Shaw, 
791 F.2d 367, 382 (5tn Cir 1983), we conclude that the 
State violated defendant's right to due process.4 
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah App. 1997) 
The State argued that any constitutional violation was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In analyzing this claim the 
Court first considered whether the jury could have construed the 
improper evidence as referring to anything but defendant's post-
4
 See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245; Tenorio, 69 
F.3d at 1106; see also United States v. Batter, 91 F.3d 427, 437-
40 (3d Cir) (assuming, but not holding, that Doyle was violated 
where prosecutor commented on defendant's silence following 
Miranda warning and subsequent waiver of Miranda right(s), cert. 
denied U.S. , 117 S. Ct. 517-18, 136 L.Ed.2d 406 
(1996). 
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Miranda silence and determined that it could not have. 
Next, the Byrd court considered whether the prosecutor's use of 
defendant's silence was "isolated." The prosecutor introduced 
defendant's post-Miranda silence on two occasions at trial. Although 
no comment was made during closing argument, both references occurred 
on the same day of the trial, which lasted only one and one-half 
days. The Court noted that the defendant was cross-examined shortly 
before the defense rested and the jury retired to deliberate. 
Therefore, although the prosecutor made only two references to the 
defendant's silence, both the short length of the trial and the 
timing of the prosecutor's references tended to weigh against the 
State on this factor. The court next considered whether the State 
offered overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. 
Here, the officer testified that he thought he saw Defendant 
purchase drugs The defendant testified that someone else in the car 
bought the drugs. Neither the State nor defendant offered 
corroborating evidence to support either version of these events. 
Thus the jury m this case had to resolve several points of 
conflicting evidence to find defendant guilty because both the State 
and defendant offered conflicting versions of events surrounding the 
alleged incident and the arrest. As such, the case came down to a 
one-on-one situation, i.e., the word of the defendant against the 
word of the key prosecution witnesses. This Court noted as follows: 
Courts have concluded that undisputed direct evidence of 
the defendant's guilt may constitute overwhelming evidence. 
. . Courts have generally refused, however, to conclude 
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that evidence was overwhelming in cases that ultimately 
rested on the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence, 
particularly where the defendant's credibility is 
involved.5 
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah App.1997) 
Accordingly, the Byrd Court found that under these 
circumstances, they could not say that the evidence against 
defendant in this case was overwhelming. 
Lastly, the Byrd Court considered the fact that no curative 
instruction was given and entered the ruling as follows: 
Because "'there is a reasonable possibility that the 
evidence complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction,'" we conclude that the prosecutor's use of 
defendant's post-Miranda silence in this case was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, (footnote omitted) 
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 537 (Utah App. 1997) 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also spoken on this 
issue. In Velarde v. Shulsen, 757 P.2d 1093 (10tn Cir. 1985), 
the Court considered the harmfulness of a Doyle violation. In 
Velarde, the defendant was cross-examined regarding his post-
arrest post-Miranda warning silence as follows: 
5
 See Velarde v. Shulsen, 151 F.2d 1093, 1095 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(per curiam) (emphasizing Doyle error not harmless in cases 
resting primarily on circumstantial evidence and uncorroborated 
and conflicting testimonies of defendant and prosecution 
witnesses); White v. State, 647 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ind.Ct.App. 
1995) (finding Doyle error not harmless where defendant's trial 
"came down to a credibility judgment; it was the victims' word 
against [defendant's]"); Aesoph v. Stats, 102 Nev. 316, 721 P.2d 
379, 383 (1986) (noting "defendant's credibility before the jury 
was crucial to his defense.") 
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Q. Mr. Velarde, on that evening, why didn't you tell 
Officer Nelson your side of the story? [defense 
counsel's objection is overruled] 
A. 'cause [sic] he read me my Miranda rights, and I 
felt that I didn't have to answer him any questions 
that would put my, that would be used against me in a 
court of law. 
Q. Mr. Velarde, haven't you repeatedly told Mr. Nelson 
after the Miranda Warning, I think, that you couldn't 
remember anything? 
A. Well, that's just like not talkin' to him. 
Q. Now but, Mr. Velarde, have you repeatedly told Mr. 
Nelson upon direct questioning from him you did not, 
that you didn't want to talk because of your legal 
rights, but simply you couldn't remember anything? 
(Vol. II at 146-147) 
Q. And is it your position, Mr. Velarde, that, do I 
understand your testimony correctly, is that you chose 
not to tell Mr. Nelson anything because you don't trust 
police officers? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So you have elected to go forward with this entire 
criminal prosecution, be arrested for vehicle theft, 
and wait until today for the first time to give your 
version of what happened? [defense counsel's objection 
is overruled by the Court] 
(Vol. II at 149) 
Q. Mr. Velarde, this is the first time that you have 
elected to state your version of what occurred in Salt 
Lake County and in Morgan County, is that true? 
A. Well yea, it's the first time I have said anything 
about the case. This is --
Q. And that, and notwithstanding, that this offense 
occurred in excess of six weeks ago? 
A. What do you mean by that? 
Q. For six weeks you have chosen to remain silent and 
to utilize just today to say --
A. I have talked to my attorney. 
(Vol. II at 151) 
Id. at 1096-1097. 
The defendant was convicted and appealed first in the State 
Court where he was unsuccessful and then to the Tenth Circuit. 
The Federal magistrate concluded that there was error but that it 
was harmless. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
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reversed finding that the prosecution's questions and remarks did 
not constitute harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In doing so, the Velarde Court noted that the only evidence 
linking the defendant to the theft was the State's witness who 
had admitted driving the stolen truck and who defendant claimed 
had given him a ride. The Court noted that under these 
circumstances that petitioner's version of the events is not so 
implausible that it can be said that the jury was unaffected by 
the prosecutor's comments on his post-arrest silence. 
The Velarde court also noted that where the jury's 
evaluation of the defendant's credibility goes to the very 
essence of the case, the admisability of tainted evidence cannot 
be considered harmless. Moreover, the Velarde Court noted that 
the entire case against the defendant was circumstantial--a fact 
which weighs against a conclusion of harmless error. 
As in Byrd and Morrison, the Court in Velarde found that 
the case came down to a one-on-one situation--the word of the 
defendant against the word of the State's witness. Therefore, 
with no corroborating evidence on either side, the importance of 
the defendant's credibility is so vital that an unconstitutional 
attack upon it cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Accordingly, the decision of the lower courts was reversed. 
The Defendant here, Ms. Karen Maas' (hereinafter "Ms. Maas") 
case is quite similar to that of Morrison, Byrd, and Velarde, and 
as in those cases, the decision of the trial Court should be 
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reversed. 
Here, the prosecutor elicited evidence of Ms. Maasf post-
Miranda silence from Officer Neil as follows: 
Q. What was the nature of your conversation with Ms. 
Maas? 
A. I met with Karen, I identified myself. I explained 
the reason I was there was I was investigating misuse 
of a credit card. At that time I explaiend to Ms. Maas 
all the evidence I had acquired up to that time. At 
that time I advised Karen of her rights, read her a 
waiver, asked her if she wanted to talk to me. She 
responded, Why, you have everything anyway? No, I 
don't want to talk to you. 
Q. After she said that did you question her any 
further? 
A. No, I left. 
Tr. at pp. 4 7-48. 
The sole purpose of putting this testimony into evidence was 
to harm Ms. Maas' credibility in front of the jury. The jury 
heard this same officer testify twice as the jury was permitted 
during deliberation to review the officer's videotaped testimony 
in it's entirety. (Tr. at p. 77; 115) Additionally, the 
prosecution used her silence in his closing to call her a liar 
and to point out to the jury that she took her time in making up 
her "story." He stated such as follows: 
. . .1 want you to go into the jury room and deliberate 
and I want you to come back out and say that we don't 
know what fraudulent credit card purchasers look like 
either, but in this case they look like defendant, and 
Karen Maas you can't lie your way out of this, we find 
you guilty. 
Tr. at p. 111-112. 
Further, the prosecution did not accidentally elicit the 
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officer's statement, but rather it came in after a side bar 
which defense specifically tried to keep it out. (Tr. at p. 
It appears that the trial Court noted the error in allowing 
this testimony at this point in the proceedings: 
THE COURT: Counsel, let's revisit the last motion. I 
didn't realize that Mr. Neil had advised her of her 
rights and asked her to waive those rights. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Yes. That's the first thing I wanted to 
ask the Court to do at this time is make a record or at 
lease make sure we have on record the side bar motion. 
I think there was a mischaracterization of the 
testimony at side bar. The characterization from the 
State was that she made some statements before he 
advised Miranda, which was contrary to the testimony 
that came in. He said he read her Miranda. 
THE COURT: Mr. Benge didn't say anything about Miranda 
warning coming before or after at any time. It was not 
a circumstance where Miranda would be required unless 
the defendant had been arrested and so I --
MR. SCHULTZ: I think his comments were that she said 
something before. That's where he says --
MR. BENGE: I think I said, She said something before 
she invoked her rights and what she said was what --
THE COURT: Yes, and that's fine. What she said before 
she invoked her rights was fine. But the invocation of 
the rights itself is probably --is not fine, in my 
opinion. So if I had known that she had been advised 
of her rights, then having been advised of her rights 
her statement, "No, I don't want to talk," is an 
invocation of her rights which should not have been 
disclosed to the jury. Her statement, "Why, you have 
everything anyway," I do not think that is an 
invocation of rights and I think that's relevant and 
admissable.[sic] So had I known that all of that was 
there I would have instructed the witness not to 
testify that she said, No, I don't want to talk. But 
he could still testify she said, Why, you have 
everything anyway? 
Tr. at pp. 49-50; emphasis added. 
Because the prosecution "uses" Ms. Maas' post-Miranda 
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silence against her at trial, a constitutional violation has 
occurred. 
Consequently, the burden now shifts to the State to show 
that this error was not harmful. In this case, the State will 
not be able to do so. Analysis of the "Reyes" factors enunciated 
in Morrison illustrate that reversal is appropriate under all 
four factors. 
The first ".Reyes" factor asks us to consider whether the 
jury would naturally and necessarily construe the comments as 
referring to defendant's silence. The answer here is yes. The 
prosecutor was specifically going after the defendant's post-
Miranda silence when he entered into this line of questioning. 
The defense tried to object during a side bar, but the Court 
allowed the questioning nonetheless.6 
6
 The following bench conference took place prior to Officer 
Neil's testimony: 
MR. SHULTZ [attorney for defendant] : I'm going to make 
an objection to any questions about whether or not he 
attempted to interview Ms. Maas. Ms. Maas refused to 
talk to him, she declined to talk to him, and I think 
that would be an improper comment in exercising her 
Fifth Amendment right now at this time. She didn't 
exercise her Fifth Amendment right, but she did refuse 
to talk to Deputy - -
MR. BENGE: Well, the comment she made before refusing 
to comment is, I think, the way she - -
THE COURT: What did she say? 
MR. BENGE: She said, Well, you have everything out, I 
don't have anything else to say. 
THE COURT: I think I'll let that in. 
MR. SCHULTZ: We're on the record. My objection went 
on the record? 
THE COURT: Yes, I think so. 
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Clearly, there was no point to the prosecution's question 
except to point out to the jury that Ms. Maas had not spoken to 
the officer, suggesting that she had something to hide. The only 
motivation for this was to undermine her credibility and use her 
silence as evidence to show that she was in fact guilty or hiding 
something; suggesting to the jury that she remained silent only 
have time to make up a story at a later date and tell it to the 
jury at trial. (Tr. at pp. 111-112) As such, the State fails to 
satisfy this first factor. 
We next consider whether the tainted evidence was isolated. 
It was not. It came before the Court not once or twice, but 
three times during a trial that lasted less than a day. It came 
in when Officer Neil first testified, then again during closing 
and then again as the jury asked to view the video tape of 
Officer Neil's testimony during deliberation.7 (Tr. at p. 48; 
115) As such, this was not an isolated incident of error. It 
occurred three times--once before and twice after the defendant 
testified as to her version of the events. Two testimonial 
references to her silence coupled with the prosecutor's argument 
(Tr. at pp. 47) 
7
 Defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's 
reference to Defendant's silence during closing and during the 
viewing of the video, nonetheless, this failure is not fatal to 
Defendant's appeal. In Morrison, no objection or request for a 
curative instruction was made by defense, but since it was plain 
error to fail to object, this Court still addressed this issue on 
appeal and reversed the trial Court's decision. State v. 
Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293 (Utah App. 1997). 
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that she was a liar (Tr. at p. 111-112) who would not talk to the 
officer (Tr. at p. 48; 77) all occurred during the course of a 
very short trial indicates that this evidence was harmful. 
The next factor we consider is whether a curative 
instruction was given. It was not. Although the Court offered 
one after the first incident where Defendant's silence was put 
before the jury, the defense declined. (Tr. at pp. 50-51) 
Thereafter no curative instruction was offered or requested after 
the prosecution used her silence against her in closing argument. 
None was offered or asked for after the jury reviewed Officer 
Neil's testimony about her silence. Further, no jury instruction 
was given to instruct the jury not to use her silence with the 
officer against her. (Tr. at pp. 84-93; R081-098) Here again, 
the State cannot show that this error was not harmful. 
Consequently, the sole factor which the State may rely on to 
establish harmless error is whether the evidence of defendant's 
guilt is overwhelming. As in Byrd, Morrison, and Velarde, the 
answer here is also no. The evidence against Ms. Maas was not 
overwhelming. In fact, in opening argument, the State admitted 
that the case against Ms. Maas was circumstantial. The 
prosecutor stated: 
. . . This is what you're going to have. This is what 
is called circumstantial evidence. We don't have a 
witness that saw Ms. Maas take Mr. Prickett's card 
number down, run it though. We don't have the witness 
showing Ms. Maas taking this camping set out of the 
store . . . 
(Tr. at pp. 8) 
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The next question we ask is whether Ms. Maasf story was 
plausible. The answer is yes. She took the stand and she 
testified to her account. (Tr. at pp. 66-82) There is nothing 
implausible about her explanation of how she came into possession 
of that camp set. 
The next consideration is whether the case depends primarily 
on the resolution of conflicting evidence consisting of 
uncorroborated and conflicting testimonies. Again the answer is 
yes. The State's case depends upon whether you are persuaded by 
purely circumstantial evidence, or whether you believe Ms. Maas 
and her friend about how she came to possess the camping set. 
The State argues that a theft by Ms. Maas is what most likely 
happened, but Ms. Maas has an explanation, leaving the jury to 
decide whether to believe her or the inference to be raised by 
the circumstantial evidence and the argument of the State. 
Again, the error was harmful as it casts doubt on her 
truthfulness when all she had to rely on in her own defense was 
her truthfulness. 
Lastly, we consider the extent to which the defense rests on 
the defendant's credibility. As just stated, all she really had 
to offer by way of defense was her own credibility, since the 
State attacked her credibility by putting her post-Miranda 
silence before the jury and calling her a liar, the error on the 
part of the State caused harm. Accordingly, it cannot be said 
that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that this error was not 
harmful and as such, reversal is constitutionally required. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court enter an order reversing the trial 
Court's decision and remand the matter for a new trial. 
DATED THIS 17th day of May, 1999. 
Happy J^ j Morgan d 
Attorney for Appellant 
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DEFENDANT, KAREN MAAS, having heretofore been found 
guilty by a jury of che offenses of: 
Count I: FALSELY SIGNING EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL CARD TRANSACTION,a 
Third Degree Felony; 
Zovnz II: UNLAWFUL USE OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD, a Class 3 
Mi sdemeanor; 
Count: III: PROPERTY OBTAINED BY UNLAWFUL FINANCIAL TRANSACTION 
CARD CONDUCT, a Class B Misdemeanor; 
and no legal reason having been shown why judgment of this Court 
.•should not: be pronounced, it is the judgment of this Court as 
follows: 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Michael A. MORRISON, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 960064-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 8, 1997. 
Defendant was convicted in the Second District 
Court, Ogden Department, Stanton Taylor, J., of 
possession of controlled substance and possession of 
dangerous weapon by restricted person. He appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that 
admission of testimony regarding defendant's decision 
to remain silent following his arrest was prejudicial 
error. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. CRIMINAL LAW <S^ 1036.1(1) 
110 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl036 Evidence 
110kl036.1 In General 
110kl036.1(l) Objections to evidence in 
general. 
Utah App. 1997. 
If counsel did not object to disputed testimony at 
trial, defendant must convince appellate court that trial 
court committed plain error by allowing allegedly 
improper testimony. 
2. CRIMINAL LAW <3^ > 1030(1) 
110 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl030 Necessity of Objections in General 
110kl030(l) In general. 
Utah App. 1997. 
To succeed on plain error claim, defendant must 
demonstrate that error exists, that error should have 
been obvious to trial court, and that error is harmful. 
3. CRIMINAL LAW <@ >^706(2) 
110 —-
110XX Trial 
110XX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k705 Presentation of Evidence 
110k706 For Prosecution 
110k706(2) Use of improper evidence; 
perjured or false testimony. 
[See headnote text below] 
3. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1037.1(3) 
110 —-
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl037 Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110kl037.1 In General 
110kl037.1(3) Presentation of evidence. 
Utah App. 1997. 
It is plain error when prosecutor violates well-
established general rule prohibiting him or her from 
eliciting testimony of defendant's post-Miranda 
silence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
4. CRIMINAL LAW <®^>706(2) 
110 — 
110XX Trial 
110XX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k705 Presentation of Evidence 
110k706 For Prosecution 
110k706(2) Use of improper evidence; 
perjured or false testimony. 
[See headnote text below] 
4. CRIMINAL LAW <@^>1037.1(3) 
110 — 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl037 Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110kl037.1 In General 
110kl037.1(3) Presentation of evidence. 
Utah App. 1997. 
It was plain error for prosecutor to elicit testimony 
from witnesses regarding defendant's decision to 
remain silent following arrest. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
5. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1163(3) 
110 — 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
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1 lOkl 163 Presumption as to Effect of Error 
1 lOkl 163(3) Rulings as to evidence. 
Utah App. 1997. 
To establish that defendant was not prejudiced by 
admission of testimony regarding his decision to 
remain silent following arrest, state bears burden of 
demonstrating that improperly elicited testimony was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
6. CRIMINAL LAW <&* 1162 
110 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
110kll62 Prejudice to rights of party as ground 
of review. 
Utah App. 1997. 
In evaluating whether evidentiary error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, appellate court 
focuses on whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that evidence complained of might have contributed to 
conviction. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
7. CRIMINAL LAW <@=^> 1169.5(5) 
110 —-
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
1 lOkl 169 Admission of Evidence 
HOkl 169.5 Curing Error by Withdrawal, 
Striking Out, or Instructions to Jury 
I lOkl 169 5(5) Admissions, declarations, and 
hearsay; confessions. 
[See headnote text below] 
7. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1169.12 
110 — 
110XXIV Review 
llOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
II Ok 1169 Admission of Evidence 
11 Ok 1169.12 Acts, admissions, declarations, and 
confessions of accused. 
Utah App. 1997. 
In determining whether defendant was prejudiced by 
testimony regarding his decision to remain silent, 
appellate court considers whether jury would naturally 
and necessarily construe comment as referring to 
defendant's silence, whether there was overwhelming 
evidence of defendant's guilt, whether reference was 
isolated, and whether trial court instructed jury not to 
draw any adverse presumption from defendant's 
decision not to testify. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
8. CRIMINAL LAW <®^>407(1) 
110 
110XVII Evidence 
HOXVII(L) Admissions 
110k405 Admissions by Accused 
110k407 Acquiescence or Silence 
110k407(l) In general. 
[See headnote text below] 
8. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1169.12 
110 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
1 lOkl 169 Admission of Evidence 
110kll69.12 Acts, admissions, declarations, and 
confessions of accused. 
Utah App. 1997. 
Defendant was prejudiced by admission of testimony 
regarding his postarrest silence; clear implication of 
testimony was that defendant might have given 
incriminating evidence but for witness' entreaty to 
remain silent, there were two references to 
defendant's in trial that lasted only one and one-half 
days, trial court gave neither a curative instruction nor 
a general instruction regarding right to remain silent 
after arrest, and evidence of defendant's guilt was not 
overwhelming. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
9. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1165(1) 
110 — 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
HOkl 165 Prejudice to Defendant in General 
llOkl 165(1) In general. 
Utah App. 1997. 
In determining whether evidence was so 
overwhelming as to overcome constitutional error, 
appellate court examines both amount of evidence 
indicating guilt as well as nature of state's case and of 
defendant's defense. 
10.CRIMINAL LAW <©=» 1165(1) 
110 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
110k 1165 Prejudice to Defendant in General 
llOkl 165(1) In general. 
Utah App. 1997. 
In determining whether evidence was so 
overwhelming as to overcome constitutional error, 
appellate court may consider whether state's case is 
based on circumstantial rather than direct evidence, 
plausibility of any exculpatory explanation for set of 
circumstances leading to charges, whether case 
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depends primarily on resolution of conflicting 
evidence consisting of uncorroborated and conflicting 
testimonies, and extent to which defense rested on 
defendant's credibility. 
*1294 Kent E. Snider, Public Defender Ass'n, 
Ogden, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen. and Kenneth A. Bronston, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Criminal Appeals Div., Salt Lake 
City, for Plaintiff and Appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and JACKSON, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Michael Morrison appeals his 
convictions, after a jury trial, of possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), and 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1995). Morrison claims, 
among other things, that at trial, the prosecution 
elicited prejudicial references to his post-arrest silence 
during examination of two witnesses. We reverse 
Morrison's convictions and remand for a new trial. 
BACKGROUND (FN1) 
On January 17, 1995, Layton City police officers 
arrived at Morrison's home to execute *1295 an 
arrest warrant unrelated to the facts of this case. At 
the house, the officers first encountered Morrison's 
mother, who directed them to Morrison's bedroom in 
the basement. Upon entering the room, the officers 
discovered Morrison in bed with Jill Crittenden and 
observed Crittenden quickly reach over Morrison and 
stash a syringe in a nearby dresser drawer. The 
officers arrested Morrison and Crittenden and 
administered Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
1624-27, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
A subsequent search of the room uncovered drugs, 
drug paraphernalia, and a loaded gun. The gun was 
found in a dresser drawer along with a prescription 
bottle with Morrison's name on it, a video rental card 
with Morrison's name on it, a work order for 
Morrison's car, and a letter addressed to Morrison. 
In addition, the officers discovered that one of the 
bullets in the gun had "K. Allen" written on it. The 
name of Morrison's parole officer at the time was 
Kim Allen. 
Morrison was charged with, among other things, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute and possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(1996) (possession with intent to distribute), § 
76-10-503 (1995) (possession of dangerous weapon by 
restricted person). At trial, one of the arresting 
officers, Detective Alan Swanson, testified that 
Morrison had initially said there were no drugs in the 
room that he knew of, and when asked about the 
syringe Crittenden had hidden, Morrison said he did 
not know it was there. Detective Swanson also 
testified that when asked if there was a gun in the 
room, Morrison initially answered no, but when asked 
about bullets that were in plain view, he indicated that 
there might be a gun in the room. According to 
Officer Swanson, Morrison eventually said that there 
may be a gun in his dresser drawer, the same dresser 
drawer where Swanson found the gun loaded with the 
"K. Allen" bullet. Also, Officer Swanson indicated 
that Morrison admitted to him at that time that he and 
Crittenden had used drugs the night before. 
Another arresting officer, Officer Robert Price, also 
testified. During this testimony, the prosecution 
elicited the following statements regarding the events 
that occurred after Morrison's arrest and the officers 
had administered the Miranda warnings: 
The prosecutor: Did you ever interview or 
specifically interrogate [Morrison]? 
Officer Price: I started talking to him very briefly 
upstairs. 
The prosecutor: Was that in [Crittenden's] 
presence? 
Officer Price: Yes, it was. 
The prosecutor: And did he initially indicate a 
willingness to talk to you? 
Officer Price: I got the indication that he was 
willing to talk to me. 
The prosecutor: And did [Crittenden] do or say 
something that stopped him? 
Officer Price: She told him to shut up. 
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The prosecutor: Did he do that? 
Officer Price: He did. 
The prosecutor: Did she tell him once or more than 
once? 
Officer Price: It was twice that she told him to shut 
up. 
Defense counsel did not object to this line of 
questioning. 
Crittenden also testified, admitting her connection 
with the January 17 episode and that she had been 
convicted of possession and distribution of a 
controlled substance in connection with the episode. 
Crittenden testified that the controlled substances and 
drug paraphernalia in the room were hers. She 
testified that she had, at some point prior to the 
January 17 episode, negotiated with an undercover 
agent for the sale of a firearm which at the time she 
said belonged to Morrison. (FN2) She further 
testified that the gun actually did not belong to 
Morrison and that because she had been negotiating 
for its sale, she took the gun from an upstairs room of 
Morrison's house and put it in the drawer in 
Morrison's room. She said she had received the 
bullets that were in the gun from a friend and took 
them to Morrison's house. 
*1296 The prosecution also asked Crittenden about 
telling Morrison to "shut up," resulting in the 
following testimony: 
The prosecutor: Okay. And, in fact, specifically 
when the police officer from Layton was trying to 
talk to [Morrison] at [Morrison's] home, you were 
telling [Morrison] to shut up? 
Crittenden: I had my lawyer on the phone. He told 
me to~I was talking to [my lawyer] on the phone 
while the police were there. 
The prosecutor: So the answer is? 
Crittenden: He advised me to be quiet and for 
[Morrison] to do the same. 
The prosecutor: So the answer is yes, you told 
[Morrison] to shut up? 
Crittenden: Yes, I did. 
Defense counsel did not object to this line of 
questioning. 
Morrison's stepfather also testified. He said that the 
pistol was his and that he had left it on a shelf in an 
upstairs bedroom of the house. 
Morrison testified in his own defense. He claimed 
the drugs and the drug paraphernalia were 
Crittenden's. He also denied having directed Officer 
Swanson to the gun or having admitted to Officer 
Swanson that he and Crittenden had used drugs the 
night before the arrest. Morrison testified that Allen 
was his friend and that he did not write the name "K. 
Allen" on the bullet. 
ISSUE 
We address the following dispositive issue: Did the 
trial court commit plain error by not sua sponte 
intervening when the prosecutor elicited testimony 
that improperly referred to Morrison's choice to 
remain silent after being arrested and after the 
Miranda warnings had been administered? 
ANALYSIS 
[1] [2] Morrison claims that the prosecutor elicited 
testimony which improperly alluded to his post-
Miranda silence. The State maintains that the alleged 
testimony does not improperly allude to Morrison's 
choice to remain silent, and that in any event, any 
error was not prejudicial. Because Morrison's 
counsel did not object to the disputed testimony at 
trial, he must now convince this court that the trial 
court committed plain error by allowing the allegedly 
improper testimony. See State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 
1055, 1057 (Utah.Ct.App. 1993). To succeed on a 
plain error claim, Morrison must demonstrate that "(i) 
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993). 
[3] [4] It is error of a nature that should be obvious 
to a trial court when the prosecutor violates the well-
established general rule prohibiting him or her from 
eliciting testimony of a defendant's post-Miranda 
silence. See Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057; see also Doyle 
v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-20, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 
2244-45, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); State v. Wiswell, 
639 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981). Thus, it was plain 
error for the prosecutor in this case to elicit testimony 
from both Crittenden and Officer Price regarding 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ronnie C. BYRD, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 950399-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 24, 1997. 
Following jury trial, defendant was convicted of 
unlawful possession of controlled substance. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Division 
I, Michael R. Murphy, J., denied defendant's motion 
for new trial, and defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) prosecutor's 
references to defendant's post-Miranda silence 
violated due process, and (2) error was not harmless. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. CRIMINAL LAW €==> 1134(4) 
110 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110k 1134 Scope and Extent in General 
1 lOkl 134(4) Rulings on motion for new trial. 
Utah App. 1997. 
Although Court of Appeals reviews trial court's 
decision to deny motion for new trial under abuse of 
discretion standard, any legal conclusions therein are 
reviewed for correctness. 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW <®^>268(8) 
92 — 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k256 Criminal Prosecutions 
92k268 Trial 
92k268(2) Particular Cases and Problems 
92k268(8) Qualifications, actions, and 
comments of judge, jury, or prosecutor. 
[See headnote text below] 
2. CRIMINAL LAW <@ >^706(2) 
110 -— 
110XX Trial 
110XX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k705 Presentation of Evidence 
110k706 For Prosecution 
110k706(2) Use of improper evidence; 
perjured or false testimony. 
[See headnote text below] 
2. CRIMINAL LAW <2^706(4) 
110 — 
110XX Trial 
110XX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k705 Presentation of Evidence 
110k706 For Prosecution 
110k706(4) Cross-examination and 
impeachment of accused. 
Utah App. 1997. 
Prosecutor's references to defendant's post-Miranda 
silence, as substantive evidence in state's case-in-chief 
and to impeach defendant, violated defendant's due 
process rights. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
3. CRIMINAL LAW <@^>730(8) 
110 
110XX Trial 
110XX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110k730 Action of Court 
110k730(8) Comments on evidence or 
witnesses. 
[See headnote text below] 
3. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1171.3 
110 —-
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
1 lOkl 171 Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
110kll71.3 Comments on evidence or 
witnesses. 
Utah App. 1997. 
To determine whether state's improper use of 
defendant's post-Miranda silence was harmless, Court 
of Appeals considers whether jury would naturally 
and necessarily construe comment as referring to 
defendant's silence, whether there was overwhelming 
evidence of defendant's guilt, whether reference was 
isolated, and whether trial court instructed jury not to 
draw any adverse presumption from defendant's 
silence. 
4. CRIMINAL LAW €=^1171.3 
110 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
1 lOkl 171 Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
1 lOkl 171.3 Comments on evidence or 
witnesses. 
Utah App. 1997. 
Prosecutor's references to defendant's post-Miranda 
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silence, in violation of due process, did not constitute 
harmless error, as references were deliberate and 
drew inferences of guilt, evidence was not 
overwhelming but was conflicting and involved 
credibility determinations, references occurred on 
same day of one and one-half day trial and one 
reference occurred shortly before jury retired to 
deliberate, and trial court did not instruct jury not to 
draw any adverse presumption from defendant's 
silence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
*533 Judith A. Jensen and Linda M. Jones, Salt 
Lake City, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Jan Graham and Thomas B. Brunker, Salt Lake 
City, for Plaintiff and Appellee. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Defendant Ronnie Byrd was convicted of two counts 
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 
third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.1996). He appeals the trial 
court's order denying his motion for a new trial. We 
reverse. 
FACTS 
On October 12, 1993, Officer Thomas Grant was 
conducting surveillance of Pioneer Park for drug-
related activity. The officer had been watching the 
north end of the park from the second story of a 
nearby building. 
Using a high-powered telescope, Officer Grant saw 
a small car pull up to the curb at the north end of the 
park. A man approached the front passenger side of 
the car, spoke briefly with someone in the car, and 
left. Another man, who appeared to be carrying a 
"twist" containing drugs, then came up to the front 
passenger side of the car. Officer Grant testified that 
the man reached into the open window of the front 
passenger door, handing the "twist" and then another 
object to someone inside. It appeared to the officer 
that the passenger in the front seat accepted both items 
and handed some cash to the man. The car then 
pulled away from the curb and left the area. 
After the car had pulled away, Officer Grant called 
Officers Martin Kaufman and David Thurgood, both 
of whom had been assigned as "take-down" officers 
for the drug surveillance operation. Officer Grant 
described the car and said that the passenger in the 
front seat had bought drugs at Pioneer Park. Officer 
Kaufman and Officer Thurgood, who were driving in 
separate cars, spotted the car, lost it for a few blocks, 
and eventually stopped it several blocks from the 
park. 
After the stop, Officer Thurgood opened the front 
passenger door of the car. The officer asked 
defendant, who was sitting in the front passenger seat, 
to get out, and escorted him to the area immediately 
behind the car. Officer Thurgood testified that he 
arrested defendant, explained the Miranda (FN1) 
rights to him, and asked him whether he understood 
his rights. Defendant replied that he understood his 
rights. The officer further testified that, when he 
asked defendant if he would talk to him, defendant 
responded affirmatively. Officer Thurgood told 
defendant that the police "had him on tape buying 
drugs at Pioneer Park." Defendant did not, in any 
way, respond to this statement. While another officer 
stayed with defendant, Officer Thurgood searched 
under the front passenger seat of the car, where he 
found cocaine and heroin. 
After defendant was arrested, Officer Thurgood and 
defendant departed for the jail. The officer testified 
that, as the police car pulled up to the jail, he asked 
defendant, "[W]hat's up, what's going on?" 
According to the officer, defendant replied that "he 
just wanted to get high, and that he purchased *534 
the drugs at Pioneer Park." Defendant denied having 
ever made such a statement. 
In a pretrial interview, Officer Kaufman, who had 
approached the driver's side of the car after the stop, 
told defense counsel that he did not search the car or 
the other occupants of the vehicle. On direct 
examination at trial, however, he testified that, upon 
obtaining consent from the driver, he searched the 
entire car after Officer Thurgood had performed a 
"cursory" search under the front passenger seat. 
Officer Kaufman admitted on cross-examination that 
before trial he had not told defense counsel that he 
remembered having searched the car. 
At trial, defendant admitted that he had been riding 
in the front passenger seat of the car, but maintained 
that the driver and backseat passenger had bought the 
drugs at Pioneer Park. Defendant further denied that 
he waived his Miranda rights or confessed to buying 
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the drugs. On direct examination of Officer 
Thurgood, the prosecutor elicited testimony that 
defendant had remained silent after receiving the 
Miranda warning. On cross-examination of 
defendant, the prosecutor also referred to defendant's 
post-Miranda silence to impeach defendant's 
exculpatory testimony. Defense counsel timely 
objected to both references, but the trial court 
declined to rule on the objections until some time after 
trial. The jury found defendant guilty of the charges. 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing 
that the State improperly used his silence at the time 
of his arrest, both in its case-in-chief and to impeach 
him on cross-examination. He also argued that the 
State violated its duty to supplement discovery by 
failing to inform defense counsel that, after the 
pretrial interview, Officer Kaufman had recalled that 
he did search the car. See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 
913, 917 (Utah 1987) (discussing prosecutor's 
"continuing obligation to reveal newly discovered 
evidence that fits within the scope of prior 
disclosures"). 
[1] The State responded that because defendant 
waived his Miranda rights, it could properly use his 
failure to deny involvement in the drug transaction 
when he was arrested. The State also argued that, 
even if it had violated its discovery obligations by 
failing to inform defense counsel about the change in 
Officer Kaufman's testimony, the error was harmless. 
The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, 
concluding that any errors committed at trial were 
harmless. Although we review the trial court's 
decision to deny the motion for a new trial under an 
abuse of discretion standard, see State v. Thomas, 830 
P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992), any legal conclusions 
therein are reviewed for correctness, see Hon ell v. 
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 909 P.2d 1279, 
1280 (Utah.Ct.App.), cert, denied, 920 P.2d 1194 
(Utah 1996). 
ANALYSIS 
The United States Supreme Court has held that, 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the prosecution may not use a 
defendant's posi-Miranda silence for impeachment 
purposes. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 
S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Similarly, 
the prosecution may not use a defendant's post-
Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt. See 
United States v. Tenorio, 69 F.3d 1103, 1106 (11th 
Cir.1995) (citing Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 
284, 295, 106 S.Ct. 634, 640-41, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 
(1986)). The prosecution's use of post-Miranda 
silence " 'prejudice^] the defendant by attempting to 
create an inference of guilt in the jury's mind.' " 
United States v. Newman, 943 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th 
Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Wycoff, 545 F.2d 
679, 681 (9th Cir.1976)); see also State v. Saunders, 
98 Ohio App.3d 355, 648 N.E.2d 587, 590 (1994) 
(noting effect of prosecutor's comment was to suggest 
guilt of defendant, "because an innocent person would 
not have remained silent"). 
[2] In the present case, the prosecutor referred to 
defendant's post-Miranda silence on two occasions. 
First, the prosecutor elicited the following testimony 
from Officer Thurgood on direct examination: 
Q [Prosecutor]: You asked the defendant to leave 
[the car]. Then what happened? 
A [Officer Thurgood]: I asked him to exit the 
vehicle, come back towards me to the *535 rear 
portion of this same vehicle. I then told this person 
that he was under arrest, placed handcuffs on him. 
Q: Then what did you do? 
A: I advised this person, or the defendant, of his 
rights. I went through the four steps that are 
necessary, asked him if he would talk to me. He 
agreed, which was a waiver of his rights. And then 
proceeded to talk to the defendant. 
Q: Then what happened? 
A: Do you want me to go through the discussions? 
Q: Yes. 
A: Okay. I first off told the defendant that I had him 
on tape buying drugs at Pioneer Park. 
Q: What did the defendant say as to that? 
A: He didn't say anything. He didn't move his 
head. 
Later, on cross-examination of defendant, the 
prosecutor used defendant's post-Miranda silence to 
impeach his earlier exculpatory testimony: 
Q [Prosecutor]: You talked to the officer after he 
had advised you of your Miranda warnings, right? 
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A [Defendant]: No, I didn't. 
Q: Do you remember him giving you the Miranda 
warnings? 
A: I can't remember if he did or not. 
Q: So it could have been or it could not have been; 
that's what you are saying? 
A: I just know ... I didn't talk to him. 
Q: You certainly did not say anything to him about 
the driver buying these drugs, did you? 
A: I didn't say anything about no drugs, period. 
Q: And certainly you didn't want to protect these 
guys, did you? 
A: Protect them from what? 
The above excerpts from the trial transcript clearly 
show that the prosecutor used defendant's silence both 
as evidence of his guilt and to impeach his 
exculpatory version of the events surrounding the 
drug transaction. Because "virtually any description 
of a defendant's silence following arrest and a 
Miranda warning will constitute a Doyle violation," 
United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 382 (5th 
Cir. 1983), we conclude that the State violated 
defendant's right to due process. See Doyle, 426 U.S. 
at 619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245; Tenorio, 69 F.3d at 1106; 
see also United States v. Baiter, 91 F.3d 427, 437-40 
(3d Cir.) (assuming, but not holding, that Doyle was 
violated where prosecutor commented on defendant's 
silence following Miranda warning and subsequent 
waiver of Miranda rights), cert, denied, — U.S. — , 
117 S.Ct. 517-18, 136 L.Ed.2d 406 (1996). (FN2) 
[3] The State argues in the alternative, however, that 
any violation of defendant's constitutional rights was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 
1717, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (concluding Doyle 
violations are trial errors subject to "harmless-beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt standard"). To determine whether 
the State's improper use of defendant's silence was 
harmless, we consider the following factors: "(1) 
whether the jury would 'naturally and necessarily 
construe' the comment as referring to defendant's 
silence; (2) whether there was overwhelming 
evidence of defendant's guilt; (3) whether the 
reference was isolated; and (4) whether the trial court 
instructed the jury not to draw any adverse 
presumption from defendant's [silence]." State v. 
Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah.Ct.App. 1993) 
(citation omitted). 
[4] In State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 
(Utah.Ct.App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1991), this court refused to hold that the jury would 
have naturally construed the prosecutor's statement as 
referring to the defendant's post-Miranda silence. Id. 
at 788. Because the statement "was made while 
commenting upon [the defendant's] trial account of the 
moments surrounding the shooting," it did not 
necessarily refer to the defendant's silence after his 
arrest on the following day. Id.; see also Green v. 
Roberts, *536 798 F.Supp. 649, 652 (D.Kan. 1992) 
(concluding that, although prosecutor's comment 
"could be construed" as reference to post-arrest 
silence, "it is equally plausible that it was a fair 
comment on petitioner's witnesses and evidence"), 
aff'd, 13 F.3d 405 (10th Cir. 1993). Here, unlike in 
Harrison, the officer's testimony and the prosecutor's 
cross-examination of defendant clearly referred to 
defendant's failure, following the Miranda warnings, 
to deny involvement in the drug transaction. The 
prosecutor's use of defendant's silence was not 
passing, "but rather [was] deliberate and drew 
inferences of guilt." Morris v. State, 112 Nev. 260, 
913 P.2d 1264, 1268 (1996). We therefore conclude 
that the jury could not have construed the improper 
evidence as referring to anything but defendant's post-
Miranda silence. 
We next consider whether the State offered 
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. Courts 
have concluded that undisputed direct evidence of the 
defendant's guilt may constitute overwhelming 
evidence. See, e.g., Passman v. Blackburn, 797 F.2d 
1335, 1349 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasizing three 
witnesses "unequivocally" identified defendant as 
perpetrator); Green, 798 F.Supp. at 652 (noting 
several eyewitnesses saw defendant commit crime). 
Courts have generally refused, however, to conclude 
that evidence was overwhelming in cases that 
ultimately rested on the jury's resolution of conflicting 
evidence, particularly where the defendant's 
credibility is involved. See Velarde v. Shulsen, 757 
F.2d 1093, 1095 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) 
(emphasizing Doyle error not harmless in cases 
resting primarily on circumstantial evidence and 
uncorroborated and conflicting testimonies of 
defendant and prosecution witnesses); White v. State, 
647 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (finding 
Doyle error not harmless where defendant's trial 
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rant" of both the civil case and the grand al system." 
jury proceedings and was characterized by 
the U.S. Supreme Court as having "no 
knowledge whatsoever of the facts under-
lying either the criminal or civil proceed-
ings " Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 229, n. 
18, 99 S.Ct. at 1678, n. 18. Rather, it 
appears that this is a case where the crimi-
nal court "will be able intelligently, on the 
basis of limited knowledge, to decide that 
disclosure [in the civil case] is plainly inap-
propriate." Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 231, 
99 S.Ct. at 1679. Thus, I do not believe 
that the federal district court erred in re-
fusing to hold an independent hearing to 
determine the admissibility of the grand 
jury materials. 
As his final argument, the Attorney Gen-
eral claims that the federal district court 
abused its discretion in dismissing the ac-
tion. Under the circumstances, I find no 
such abuse. The Attorney General was 
granted several continuances to give him 
the opportunity to convince the state court 
that the secrecy order should be lifted. 
The state district court, however, refused 
to lift the order, and its ruling has recently 
been upheld by the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals. State v. Tynan, Slip Opinion (Colo. 
App. November 8, 1984). The Attorney 
General repeatedly advised the federal dis-
trict court that he could not proceed to trial 
unless he could make use of the records 
subject to the secrecy order. The federal 
proceeding cannot be continued ad infini-
tum on the chance that some day in the 
distant future the secrecy order may be 
lifted. 
1093 
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 
90, 95-96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415-416, 66 
L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). I believe the decisions 
of the Colorado trial court and Colorado 
Court of Appeals, holding that the records 
are grand jury materials entitled to secre-
cy, should be respected by the federal 
courts. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM S> 
Fred VELARDE, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Ken SHULSEN, Warden, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 84-2452. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
March 22, 1985. 
In closing, I reemphasize my belief that a 
state court protective order is entitled to 
the respect of the federal courts. State 
court judgments are entitled to such "full 
faith and credit in every court within the 
United States . as they have by law and 
usage in the courts of such state." 28 
U S.C. § 1738. As stated by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, "[t]he federal courts have 
. . consistently accorded preclusive effect 
to issues decided by state courts," noting 
that such a practice "promote[s] the comity 
between state and federal courts that has 
been recognized as a bulwark of the feder-
Defendant who had been imprisoned 
pursuant to state auto theft conviction filed 
habeas corpus action. The United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, 
David K Winder, J., denied defendant's 
application for writ, and defendant appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals held that consti-
tutional error arising from prosecution's 
cross-examination of defendant concerning 
his postarrest, post-Miranda silence was 
not harmless, where prosecution's case was 
entirely circumstantial, where only evi-
dence linking defendant to auto theft with 
which he was charged was testimony of 
state's witness, who himself had admitted 
driving vehicle in question, where trial was 
short, and where prosecutor's comments 
during closing argument emphasized post-
arrest silence. 
Reversed 
rections. 
and remanded with di-
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1. Habeas Corpus «=>85.5(1) 
Once there has been determination of 
constitutional error with respect to prose-
cution's reference to defendant's postarrest 
silence, it is government's burden to show 
that comments made with regard to de-
fendant's silence were harmless beyond 
reasonable doubt. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
5. 
2. Habeas Corpus <£=>30(1) 
With regard to determination of 
whether constitutional error was harmless, 
fact that prosecution's case is entirely cir-
cumstantial weighs against conclusion of 
harmless error. 
3. Habeas Corpus <s=>45.3(1.30) 
"Cause and prejudice" standard of 
Wainwrigkt v. Sykes decision of United 
States Supreme Court, rather than "plain 
error" standard, applies in habeas proceed-
ing attacking state conviction, when state 
courts invoke state law to dismiss defend-
ant's federal claims on procedural grounds 
that defendant did not properly object. 
4. Habeas Corpus e=*30(l) 
Constitutional error arising from pros-
ecution's cross-examination of defendant 
concerning his postarrest, post-Miranda si-
lence was not harmless, where prosecu-
tion's case was entirely circumstantial, 
where only evidence linking defendant to 
auto theft with which he was charged was 
testimony of state's witness, who himself 
had admitted driving vehicle in question, 
where trial was short, and where prosecu-
tor's comments during closing argument 
emphasized postarrest silence. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
Fred Velarde, pro se. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., and J. 
Stephen Mikita, Asst. Atty. Gen., the State 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defend-
ant-appellee. 
Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, LO-
GAN, Circuit Judge, and MOORE, District 
Judge.* 
PER CURIAM. 
This three-judge panel has determined 
unanimously that oral argument would not 
be of material assistance in the determina-
tion of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 
10th Cir.R. 10(e). The cause is therefore 
ordered submitted without oral argument. 
This is an appeal from an order of the 
district court denying petitioner's applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus brought 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
Petitioner, currently incarcerated at the 
Utah State Prison, brought this action for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah. 
Petitioner asserted that in November of 
1982, he had been convicted, after trial by 
jury in the district court of Morgan County, 
Utah, of the second-degree felony of auto 
theft and sentenced to a one—to fifteen-
year term of imprisonment. Petitioner's 
conviction was affirmed by the Utah Su-
preme Court on January 9, 1984, whereup-
on petitioner filed this habeas corpus ac-
tion. Petitioner has exhausted available 
state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 
The sole issue presented to the federal 
district court in the habeas petition (as well 
as to the Utah Supreme Court on direct 
appeal) was whether the trial court erred in 
permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine 
petitioner regarding his post-arrest, post-
"Miranda warning" silence, and in permit-
ting the prosecutor to make reference to 
petitioner's silence in his closing statement, 
in violation of petitioner's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process. (Rele-
vant portions of the trial transcript are 
reproduced in the appendix following this 
opinion.) After consideration of the trial 
transcript, the opinion of the Utah Supreme 
Court, and the arguments submitted by the 
parties, the federal magistrate concluded 
that the prosecutor's questions could be 
* The Honorable John P. Moore, United States 
District Judge for the District of Colorado, sit-
ting by designation. 
divided into two categories, 
tions were directed towards showing that 
what petitioner told Officer Nelson was 
inconsistent with petitioner's testimony on 
the stand. Instead of admitting the incon-
sistency, petitioner denied making a state-
ment and claimed he invoked his right to 
silence. However, petitioner's testimony 
was refuted by Officer Nelson's testimony. 
The Utah Supreme Court resolved this fac-
tual question of whether petitioner had 
made a statement to Officer Nelson or said 
nothing in favor of the prosecution. This 
factual determination the magistrate found 
to be supported by the record and entitled 
to a presumption of correctness (Vol. I at 
61). 
The magistrate found that the prosecutor 
also engaged in a second type of question-
ing which was designed to call attention to 
the fact that petitioner had not made any 
exculpatory statements at the time of the 
arrest. This examination the magistrate 
found was in effect an inquiry into petition-
er's silence at the time of his arrest. The 
magistrate determined that these questions 
were not related to prior inconsistent state-
ments as allowed by Anderson v. Charles, 
447 U.S. 404, 100 S.Ct 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222 
(1980), but were of the type specifically 
prohibited under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 
S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Conse-
quently, the magistrate concluded, and the 
district court agreed, that this portion of 
the prosecutor's examination was constitu-
tional error. 
The magistrate then concluded that this 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 
The Attorney General's brief before us 
agrees that there was constitutional error 
in the latter portion of the questioning, 
arguing only that the error was harmless. 
[1] We conclude that there was consti-
tutional error in at least part of the ques-
tioning and in the argument. Doyle v. 
Ohio, supra; Johnson v. Patterson, 475 
F.2d 1066, 1067 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 
414 U.S. 878, 94 S.Ct. 64, 38 L.Ed.2d 124 
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Certain ques- (1973). The issue then is whether the pros-
ecutor's questions and remarks constituted 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 
S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Once 
there has been a determination of constitu-
tional error, it is the government's burden 
to show that comments made with regard 
to a defendant's silence were harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 
Barton, 731 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir.1984). 
In this case the state did not argue the 
question of harmless error in the federal 
district court, but it does now in the recent 
appellee's memorandum brief at page 3. 
This court has held that where the case 
comes down to a one-on-one situation, i.e., 
the word of the defendant against the word 
of the key prosecution witness, and there is 
no corroboration on either side, the impor-
tance of the defendant's credibility be-
comes so significant that prosecutorial er-
ror attacking that credibility cannot be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
United States v. Polsinelli, 649 F.2d 793, 
798 (10th Cir. 1981). Similarly, this court 
ruled in United States v. Johnson, 495 
F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1974), that where the 
very essence of a case is the jury's evalua-
tion of defendant's credibility, the admis-
sion of tainted evidence cannot be con-
sidered harmless. Id. at 246 n. 5. 
[2-4] In this case, the prosecution's 
case was entirely circumstantial, a factor 
which weighs against a conclusion of harm-
less error. See Keen v. Detroit Diesel 
Allison, 569 F.2d 547, 556 (10th Cir. 1978) 
(McKay, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). The only evidence linking 
petitioner to the theft of the truck was that 
of the state's witness, who had admitted 
driving the truck and who, petitioner 
claimed, had been the driver of the truck at 
the time he gave petitioner a ride. Peti-
tioner's version of the events is not so 
implausible that it can be said that the jury 
was unaffected by the prosecutor's com-
ments on his post-arrest silence. There 
was no corroborating evidence to support 
either version of the story. United States 
1096 757 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
v. Polsinelli, 649 F.2d at 798; United 
States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d at 246 n. 5. 
The transcript reveals that the presenta-
tion of both the state's and petitioner's 
evidence lasted only one morning. Conse-
quently, the prosecutor's inquiries regard-
ing petitioner's failure to give his version 
of the story at the time of arrest in the 
context of this short trial take on greater 
significance. See United States v. Brid-
well, 583 F.2d 1135, 1139 (10th Cir.1978). 
Moreover, the trial court judge did not give 
a curative instruction and, to the contrary, 
overruled defense counsel's objections. 
United States v. Barton, 731 F.2d 669, 675 
(10th Cir.1984). Unlike Bridwell, the evi-
dence here is less than overwhelming. 
Finally, the prosecutor's intent to call 
attention to petitioner's silence at the time 
of his arrest is further demonstrated by his 
comments during closing argument, which, 
contrary to the magistrate's conclusions, do 
emphasize petitioner's post-arrest silence. 
There had been repeated objections to the 
constitutional error in the questioning (Vol. 
II at 147, 149, 150), which were overruled. 
The absence of a further objection to the 
argument itself does not preclude consider-
ation of the constitutional error in the ar-
gument because the Utah Supreme Court 
considered petitioner's contention on this 
issue on the merits and there was no find-
ing of a procedural default by petitioner in 
the state court trial. Ulster County Court 
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 
2223, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979); see Engle v. 
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 n. 44, 102 S.Ct. 
1. In so holding, we are mindful of the recent 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. 
Young, — US. — , 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L Ed.2d 
1 (1985). There the Court held that a prose-
cutor's improper remarks in closing argument 
pertaining to his personal belief of defendant's 
guilt did not constitute "plain error" undermin-
ing the fundamental fairness of the trial, on 
consideration of the entire record The Court 
there applied the "plain error" standard because 
the case involved a direct appeal asserting er-
rors not objected to at trial. 
However, the "plain error" standard does not 
apply and instead the "cause and prejudice" 
standard of Wainwnght v. Sykes, 433 U S. 72, 97 
S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed 2d 594 (1977), applies in a 
habeas proceeding attacking a state conviction, 
when the state courts invoke state law to dis-
1558, 1575 n. 44, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). 
We therefore hold that there was constitu-
tional error in the repeated questions by 
the prosecuting attorney and the closing 
argument which violated petitioner's due 
process right to remain silent, contrary to 
the holding of Doyle v. Ohio, supra, and 
other authorities.1 
We also note that a certificate of proba-
ble cause was not issued in the district 
court. However, in the interest of justice, 
we will construe petitioner's notice of ap-
peal as such a request, pursuant to Fed.R. 
App.P. 22(b), and hereby issue a certificate 
of probable cause. 
The judgment of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah is RE-
VERSED. The cause is REMANDED with 
directions that it be held in abeyance for 
sixty days to permit the state to re-try the 
petitioner; if such retrial does not occur, 
then the writ shall issue. 
Appendix 
During the course of the prosecution's 
cross-examination of petitioner, the prose-
cutor asked petitioner the following ques-
tions: 
Q. Mr. Velarde, on that evening, why 
didn't you tell Officer Nelson your 
side of the story? [defense coun-
sel's objection is overruled] 
A. 'cause [sic] he read me my Miranda 
rights, and I felt that I didn't have 
to answer him any questions that 
miss a defendant's federal claims on procedural 
grounds that the defendant did not properly 
object. See Hux v. Murphy, 733 F.2d 737, 739 
(10th Cir.1984), c/. United States v. Frady, 456 
U.S 152, 164-66, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592-93, 71 
L.Ed 2d 816 (1982); see also Henderson v. Kibbe, 
431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1736, 52 
L Ed 2d 203 (1977). Nevertheless, we need not 
reach the "cause and prejudice" test here be-
cause the state court considered the constitu-
tionality of the closing argument on the merits 
and made no finding of procedural default. 
Hux v. Murphy, 733 F 2d at 738-39, Monshita v. 
Moms, 702 F 2d 207, 209 (10th Cir.1983); Corn 
v. Zant, 708 F 2d 549, 555 n. 2 (11th Cir.1983), 
cert, denied, — U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 2670, 81 
L.Ed.2d 375 (1984). 
VELARDE v. 
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Appendix—Continued 
would put my, that would be used 
against me in a court of law. 
Q. Mr. Velarde, haven't you repeatedly 
told Mr. Nelson after the Miranda 
Warning, I think, that you couldn't 
remember anything? 
A. Well, that's just like not talkin' to 
him. 
Q. Now but, Mr. Velarde, have you re-
peatedly told Mr. Nelson upon direct 
questioning from him did you not, 
that you didn't want to talk because 
of your legal rights, but simply you 
couldn't remember anything? 
(Vol. II at 146-147). 
Q. And is it your position, Mr. Velarde, 
that, do I understand your testimony 
correctly, is that you chose not to 
tell Mr. Nelson anything because 
you don't trust police officers? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So you have elected to go forward 
with this entire criminal prosecution, 
be arrested for vehicle theft, and 
wait until today for the first time to 
give your version of what happened? 
[defense counsel's objection is over-
ruled by the court] 
(Vol. II at 149). 
Q Mr. Velarde, this is the first time 
that you have elected to state your 
version of what occurred in Salt 
Lake County and in Morgan County, 
is that true? 
A. Well yea, it's the first time I have 
said anything about the case. This 
is— 
Q. And that, and notwithstanding that 
this offense occurred in excess of six 
weeks ago? 
A. What do you mean by that? 
SHULSEN 1097 
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Q. For six weeks you have chosen to 
remain silent and to utilize just to-
day to say— 
A. I have talked to my attorney. 
(Vol. II at 151). 
During the course of closing arguments 
the prosecutor stated: 
Why does Mr. Velarde remember now 
but he didn't remember then? Why 
does Mr. Pentz in effect put himself back 
into the boiling water by calling the Sher-
iff's Office, telling him where to go and 
then unlike Mr. Velarde, relate to the 
officer what happened? And why 
does Mr. Velarde wait six weeks? Why 
not at the accident scene say, I'm inno-
cent? 
(Vol. II at 159) (emphasis added). 
Later, during his rebuttal the prosecutor 
said: 
but human nature is not such that Mr. 
Pentz would put everything on the line to 
put himself back into a crime with no 
expectations that Mr. Velarde in a sense 
of outrage, in a sense of absolute pure 
indignation will say hey, wait a minute, 
let's get this story straight. He picked 
me up in Salt Lake. I passed out. He 
drqye me here. I didn't ever have that 
truck. But instead he said 
(Vol. II at 165). 
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DOYLE v. OHIO 
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, 
TUSCARAWAS COUNTY 
No. 75-5014. Argued February 23, 1976—Decided June 17, 1976* 
During the course of their state criminal trials petitioners, who after 
arrest were given warnings in line with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U. S. 436, 467-473, took the stand and gave an exculpatory 
story that they had not previously told to the police or the 
prosecutor. Over their counsel's objection, they were cross-
examined as to why they had not given the arresting officer 
the exculpatory explanations. Petitioners were convicted, and, 
their convictions were upheld on appeal. Held: The use for 
impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of ar-
rest and after they received Miranda warnings, violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Post-arrest silence 
following such warnings is insolubly ambiguous; moreover, it 
would be fundamentally unfair to allow an arrestee's silence to be 
used to impeach an explanation subsequently given at trial after 
he had been impliedly assured, by the Miranda warnings, that si-
lence would carry no penalty. Pp. 616-620. 
Reversed and remanded. 
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, 
C. J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, W H I T E , and MARSHALL, JJ , joined. 
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and 
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 620. 
James R. Willis argued the cause for petitioners and 
filed briefs in both cases. 
Ro?mld L. Collins argued the cause pro hac vice and 
filed a brief for respondent in both cases.t 
^Together with No. 75-5015, Wood v. Ohio, also on certiorari to 
the same court. 
•[Solicitor General Bork filed a brief for the United States as 
amicus curiae. 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The question in these consolidated cases is whether a 
state prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendant's ex-
culpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by cross-
examining the defendant about his failure to have told 
the story after receiving Miranda warnings 1 at the time 
of his arrest. We conclude that use of the defendant's 
post-arrest silence in this manner violates due process, 
and therefore reverse the convictions of both petitioners. 
I 
Petitioners Doyle and Wood were arrested together 
and charged with selling 10 pounds of marihuana to a 
local narcotics bureau informant. They were convicted 
in the Common Pleas Court of Tuscarawas County, Ohio, 
in separate trials held about one week apart. The evi-
dence at their trials was identical in all material respects. 
The State's witnesses sketched a picture of a routine 
marihuana transaction. William Bonnell, a well-known 
"street person" with a long criminal record, offered to 
assist the local narcotics investigation unit in setting 
up drug "pushers" in return for support in his efforts 
to receive lenient treatment in his latest legal prob-
lems. The narcotics agents agreed. A short time later, 
Bonnell advised the unit that he had arranged a "buy" 
of 10 pounds of marihuana and needed $1,750 to pay 
for it. Since the banks were closed and time was short, 
the agents were able to collect only $1,320. Bonnell 
took this money and left for the rendezvous, under sur-
veillance by four narcotics agents in two cars. As 
planned, he met petitioners in a bar in Dover, Ohio. 
From there, he and petitioner Wood drove in BonnelPs 
1
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 467-473 (1966). 
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pickup truck to the nearby town of New Philadelphia, 
Ohio, while petitioner Doyle drove off to obtain the 
marihuana and then meet them at a prearranged location 
in New Philadelphia. The narcotics agents followed the 
Bonnell truck. When Doyle arrived at Bonneirs wait-
ing truck in New Philadelphia, the two vehicles pro-
ceeded to a parking lot where the transaction took 
place. Bonnell left in his truck, and Doyle and Wood 
departed in Doyle's car. They quickly discovered that 
they had been paid $430 less than the agreed-
upon price, and began circling the neighborhood look-
ing for Bonnell. They were stopped within minutes 
by New Philadelphia police acting on radioed instruc-
tions from the narcotics agents. One of those agents, 
Kenneth Beamer, arrived on the scene promptly, arrested 
petitioners, and gave them Miranda warnings. A search 
of the car, authorized by warrant, uncovered the SI,320. 
At both trials, defense counsel's cross-examination of 
the participating narcotics agents was aimed primarily 
at establishing that, due to a limited view of the park-
ing lot, none of them had seen the actual transaction 
but had seen only Bonnell standing next to Doyle's 
car with a package under his arm, presumably after 
the transaction.2 Each petitioner took the stand at 
his trial and admitted practically everything about the 
State's case except the most crucial point: who was 
2
 Defense counsel's efforts were not totally successful. One of 
the four narcotics agents testified at both trials that lu1 had seen 
the package passed through the window of Doyle's car to Bonnell. 
In an effort to impeach that testimony, defense counsel played a 
tape of the preliminary hearing at which the same ag^nt had testi-
fied only to seeing the package under Bonneirs arm. The agent 
did not retract his trial testimony, and both he and the prosecutor 
explained the apparent inconsistency by noting that the examination 
at the preliminary hearing had not focused upon whether anyone 
had seen the package pass to Bonnell. 
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selling marihuana to whom. According to petitioners, 
Bonnell had framed them. The arrangement had been 
for Bonnell to sell Doyle 10 pounds of marihuana. 
Doyle had left the Dover bar for the purpose of borrow-
ing the necessary money, but while driving by himself 
had decided that he only wanted one or two pounds 
instead of the agreed-upon 10 pounds. When Bonnell 
reached Doyle's car in the New Philadelphia parking lot, 
with the marihuana under his arm, Doyle tried to ex-
plain his change of mind. Bonnell grew angry, threw 
the $1,320 into Doyle's car, and took all 10 pounds of 
the marihuana back to his truck. The ensuing chase was 
the effort of Wood and Doyle to catch Bonnell to find 
out what the $1,320 was all about. 
Petitioners' explanation of the events presented some 
difficulty for the prosecution, as it was not entirely im-
plausible and there was little if any direct evidence to 
contradict it.3 As part of a wide-ranging cross-examina-
tion for impeachment purposes, and in an effort to under-
cut the explanation, the prosecutor asked each petitioner 
at his respective trial why he had not told the frameup 
story to Agent Beamer when he arrested petitioners. In 
the first trial, that of petitioner Wood, the following 
colloquy occurred: 4 
"Q. [By the prosecutor.] Mr. Beamer did arrive 
on the scene? 
"A. [By Wood.] Yes, he did. 
"Q. And I assume you told him all about what 
happened to you? 
"A. No. 
3
 See n. 2, supra. 
1
 Trial transcript in Ohio v. Wood, No. 10057, Common Pleas 
Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Wood Tr.), 465-470. 
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"Q. You didn't tell Mr. Beamer? 
"A. No. 
"Q. You didn't tell Mr. Beamer this guy put 
$1,300 in your car? 
• • • • • 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. And we can't understand any reason why any-
one would put money in your car and you were chas-
ing him around town and trying to give it back? 
"A. I didn't understand that. 
"Q. You mean you didn't tell him that? 
"A. Tell him what? 
"Q. Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with 
this and you are innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived 
on the scene why didn't you tell him? 
"Q. But in any event you didn't bother to tell 
Mr. Beamer anything about this? 
"A. No, sir." 
Defense counsel's timely objections to the above ques-
tions of the prosecutor were overruled. The cross-ex-
amination of petitioner Doyle at his trial contained a 
similar exchange, and again defense counsel's timely 
objections were overruled.6 
5
 Trial transcript in Ohio v. Doyle, No. 10656, Common Pleas 
Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Doyle Tr.), 504-507: 
"Q. [By the prosecutor.] . . . You are innocent? 
"A. [By Doyle.] I am innocent. Yes Sir. 
"Q. That's why you told the police department and Kenneth 
Beamer when they arrived— 
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Each petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, 
Fifth District, Tuscarawas County, alleging, inter alia, 
that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to 
cross-examine the petitioner at his trial about his post-
arrest silence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the con-
victions, stating as to the contentions about the post-
arrest silence: 
"This was not evidence offered by the state in its 
case in chief as confession by silence or as substan-
tive evidence of guilt but rather cross examination 
"(Continuing.)—about your innocence? 
"A. . . . I didn't tell them about my innocence. No. 
"Q. You said nothing at all about how you had been set up? 
"Q. Did Mr. Wood? 
"A. Not that I recall, Sir. 
"Q. As a matter of fact, if I recall your testimony correctly, you 
said instead of protesting your innocence, as you do today, you said 
in response to a question of Mr. Beamer,—'I don't know what you 
are talking about.' 
"A. I believe what I said,—'What's this all about?' If I remem-
ber, that's the only thing I said. 
"A. I was questioning, you know, what it was about. That's 
what I didn't know. I knew that I was trying to buy, which was 
wrong, but I didn't know what was going on. I didn't know that 
Bill Bonnell was trying to frame me, or what-have-you. 
"Q. All right,—But you didn't protest your innocence at that 
time? 
"A. Not until I knew what was going on." 
In addition, the court in both trials permitted the prosecutor, 
over more objections, to argue petitioners' post-arrest silence to the 
jury. Closing Argument of Prosecutor 13-14, supplementing Wood 
Tr.; Doyle Tr. 515, 526. 
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of a witness as to why he had not told the same 
story earlier at his first opportunity. 
"We find no error in this. I t goes to credibility 
of the witness." 
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied further review. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether impeachment 
use of a defendant's post-arrest silence violates any pro-
vision of the Constitution/ a question left open last Term 
in United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171 (1975), and on 
which the Federal Courts of Appeals are in conflict. See 
id., at 173 n. 2. 
I I 
The State pleads necessity as justification for the 
prosecutor's action in these cases. I t argues that the 
discrepancy between an exculpatory story at trial and 
silence at time of arrest gives rise to an inference that 
the story was fabricated somewhere along the way, per-
haps to fit within the seams of the State's case as it was 
developed at pretrial hearings. Noting that the prose-
cution usually has little else with which to counter such 
an exculpatory story, the State seeks only the right to 
cross-examine a defendant as to post-arrest silence for 
the limited purpose of impeachment. In support of its 
position the State emphasizes the importance of cross-
6
 Petitioners also claim constitutional error because each of them 
was cross-examined by the prosecutor as to why he had not told 
the exculpatory story at the preliminary hearing or any other time 
prior to the trials. In addition, error of constitutional dimension is 
asserted because each petitioner was cross-examined as to post-arrest, 
preliminary hearing, and general pretrial silence when he testified as a 
defense witness at the other petitioner's trial. These averments of 
error present different considerations from those implicated by cross-
examining petitioners as defendants as to their silence after receiv-
ing Miranda warnings at the time of arrest. In view of our disposi-
tion of this case we find it unnecessary to reach these additional 
issues. 
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examination in general, see Brown v. United States, 356 
U. S. 148, 154-155 (1958), and relies upon those cases 
in which this Court has permitted use for impeachment 
purposes of post-arrest statements that were inadmissible 
as evidence of guilt because of an officer's failure to 
follow Miranda's dictates. Harris v. New York, 401 
U. S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975) ; 
see also Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). 
Thus, although the State does not suggest petitioners' 
silence could be used as evidence of guilt, it contends 
that the need to present to the jury all information 
relevant to the truth of petitioners' exculpatory story 
fully justifies the cross-examination that is at issue. 
Despite the importance of cross-examination,7 we have 
concluded that the Miranda decision compels rejection 
of the State's position. The warnings mandated by that 
case, as a prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth 
Amendment rights, see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 
433, 443-444 (1974), require that a person taken into 
custody be advised immediately that he has the right 
to remain silent, that anything he says may be used 
against him, and that he has a right to retained or 
appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation. 
Silence in the wake of these warnings may be noth-
ing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda 
rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly am-
biguous because of what the State is required to advise 
the person arrested.8 See United States v. Hale, supra, 
7
 We recognize, of course, that unless prosecutors are allowed wide 
leeway in the scope of impeachment cross-examination some defend-
ants would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function of a trial 
by presenting tailored defenses insulated from effective challenge. 
See generally Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U. S. 304, 315 (1900). 
8
 The dissent by MR. JUSTICE STEVENS expresses the view that 
the giving of Miranda warnings does not lessen the "probative 
value of [a defendant's] silence . . . ." Post, at 621. But in United 
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at 177. Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda 
warnings contain no express assurance that silence will 
carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person 
who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it 
would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due 
process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used 
to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.0 
States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171, 177 (1975), we noted that silence at 
the time of arrest may be inherently ambiguous even apart from the 
effect of Miranda warnings, for in a given case there may be several 
explanations for the silence that are consistent with the existence 
of an exculpatory explanation. In Hale we exercised our super-
visory powers over federal courts. The instant cases, unlike Hale, 
come to us from a state court and thus provide no occasion for 
the exercise of our supervisory powers. Nor is it necessary, in view 
of our holding above, to express an opinion on the probative value 
for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence. We note only that 
the Hale court considered silence at the time of arrest likely to be 
ambiguous and thus of dubious probative value. 
9
 A somewhat analogous situation was presented in Johnson v. 
United States, 318 U. S. 189 (1943). A defendant who testified 
at his trial was permitted by the trial judge to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to cer-
tain questions on cross-examination. This Court assumed that it 
would not have been error for the trial court to have denied the 
privilege in the circumstances, see id., at 196, in which case a failure 
to answer would have been a proper basis for adverse inferences 
and a proper subject for prosecutorial comment. But because the 
privilege had been granted, even if erroneously, "the requirements 
of fair trial" made it error for the trial court to permit comment 
upon the defendant's silence. Ibid. 
"An accused having the assurance of the court that his claim of 
privilege would be granted might well be entrapped if his assertion 
of the privilege could then be used against him. His real choice 
might then be quite different from his apparent one. . . . Elemen-
tary fairness requires that an accused should not be misled on 
that score." Id., at 197. 
Johnson was decided under this Court's supervisory powers over 
the federal courts. But the necessity for elementary fairness is not 
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MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in tbc judgment in 
United States v. Hale, supra, at 182-183, put it very well: 
"[W]hen a person under arrest is informed, as 
Miranda requires, that he may remain silent, that 
anything he says may be used against him, and that 
he may have an attorney if he wishes, it seems to 
me that it does not comport with due process to per-
mit the prosecution during the trial to call attention 
to his silence at the time of arrest and to insist that 
because he did not speak about the facts of the case 
at that time, as he was told he need not do, an 
unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the 
truth of his trial testimony. . . . Surely Hale was 
not informed here that his silence, as well as his 
words, could be used against him at trial. Indeed, 
anyone would reasonably conclude from Miranda 
warnings that this would not be the case." 10 
We hold that the use for impeachment purposes of 
petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiv-
ing Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 The State has not 
unique to the federal criminal system. Cf. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 
423, 437-440 (1959). 
10
 The dissenting opinion relies on the fact that petitioners 
in this case, when cross-examined about their silence, did not offer 
reliance on Miranda warnings as a justification. But the error we 
perceive lies in the cross-examination on this question, thereby 
implying an inconsistency that the jury might construe as evidence 
of guilt. After an arrested person is formally advised by an officer 
of the law that he has a right to remain silent, the unfairness 
occurs when the prosecution, in the presence of the jury, is allowed 
to undertake impeachment on the basis of what may be the exercise 
of that right. 
11
 I t goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence 
could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who 
testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told 
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claimed that such use in the circumstances of this case 
might have been harmless error. Accordingly, peti-
tioners' convictions are reversed and their causes re-
manded to the state courts for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK-
MUN and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
Petitioners assert that the prosecutor's cross-examina-
tion about their failure to mention the purported "frame" 
until they testified at trial violated their constitutional 
right to due process and also their constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination. I am not persuaded by 
the first argument; though there is merit in a portion of 
the second, I do not believe it warrants reversal of these 
state convictions. 
The Court's due process rationale has some of the 
characteristics of an estoppel theory. If (a) the de-
fendant is advised that he may remain silent, and (b) he 
does remain silent, then we (c) presume that his decision 
was made in reliance on the advice, and (d) conclude 
that it is unfair in certain cases, though not others,1 to 
use his silence to impeach his trial testimony. The key 
to the Court's analysis is apparently a concern that the 
Miranda warning, which is intended to increase the prob-
the police the same version upon arrest. In that situation the fact 
of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory 
story, but rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to his 
behavior following arrest. Cf. United States v. Fair child, 505 F. 2d 
1378, 1383 (CA5 1975). 
1
 As the Court acknowledges, the "fact of post-arrest silence could 
be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies 
to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the 
police the same version upon arrest." Ante, at G19 and this page, 
n. 11. 
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ability that a person's response to police questioning will 
be intelligent and voluntary, will actually be deceptive 
unless we require the State to honor an unstated promise 
not to use the accused's silence against him. 
In my judgment there is nothing deceptive or preju-
dicial to the defendant in the Miranda warning.2 Nor 
do I believe that the fact that such advice was given to 
the defendant lessens the probative value of his silence, 
or makes the prosecutor's cross-examination about his 
silence any more unfair than if he had received no such 
warning. 
This is a case in which the defendants' silence at the 
time of their arrest was graphically inconsistent with 
their trial testimony that they were the unwitting vic-
tims of a "frameup" in which the police did not partici-
pate. If defendants had been framed, their failure to 
mention that fact at the time of their arrest is almost 
2
 At Wood's trial, the arresting officer described the warning 
he gave petitioners: 
"I told Mr Wood and Mr. Doyle of the Miranda warning rights— 
they had the right to remain silent, anything they said could and 
would be used against them in a court of law, and they had the 
right to an attorney and didn't have to say anything without an 
attorney being present and if they couldn't afford one, the court 
would appoint them one at the proper time." Trial transcript in 
Ohio v. Wood, No. 10657, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas 
County, Ohio (hereafter Wood Tr.) , 12G. At the Doyle trial, he 
testified that he "gave them their rights" and gave them a " 'Mi-
randa Warning.'" Trial transcript in Ohio v. Doyle, No. 10656, 
Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Doyle 
Tr.), 269. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, requires the following 
warning: 
"[The suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he 
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used 
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence 
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will 
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." 
Id., at 479. 
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inexplicable; for that reason, under accepted rules of 
evidence, their silence is tantamount to a prior incon-
sistent statement and admissible for purposes of 
impeachment.3 
Indeed, there is irony in the fact that the Miranda 
warning provides the only plausible explanation for their 
silence. If it were the true explanation, I should think 
that they would have responded to the questions on 
cross-examination about why they had remained silent 
by stating that they relied on their understanding of the 
advice given by the arresting officers. Instead, however, 
they gave quite a different jumble of responses.4 Those 
3 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence §1042 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
4
 Petitioner Doyle gave the following testimony on direct and 
cross-examination at his trial: 
"Q- [By defense counsel.] And you were placed under arrest at 
that time? 
"A. [By Doyle.] Yes. I asked what for and he said,—Tor the 
sale of marijuana/ I told him,—I didn't know what he was talk-
ing about. 
"Q- [By the prosecutor.] As a matter of fact, if I recall your 
testimony correctly, you said instead of protesting your innocence, 
as you do today, you said in response to a question of Mr. 
Beamer,—'I don't know what you are talking about.' 
"A. [By Doyle.] I believe what I said,—'What's this all about?' 
If I remember, that's the only thing I said. 
"Q. You testified on direct. 
"A. If I did, then I didn't understand. 
" . . . I was questioning, you know, what it was about. That's 
what I didn't know. I knew that I was trying to buy, which was 
wrong, but I didn't know what was going on. I didn't know that 
Bill Bonnell was trying to frame me, or what-have-you. 
"Q. All right,—But you didn't protest your innocence at that 
time? 
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responses negate the Court's presumption that their 
silence was induced by reliance on deceptive advice. 
Since the record requires us to put to one side the 
"A. Not until I knew what was going on." Doyle Tr. 479, 
506-507. 
At Wood's trial, Doyle gave a somewhat different explanation 
of his silence at the time of arrest: 
"Q. [By the prosecutor.] Why didn't [Wood] tell ["the police 
officers] about Mr. Bonnell? 
"A. [By Doyle.] Because we didn't know what was going on 
and wanted to find out. 
"Q. So he hid the money under the mat? 
"A. The police officers said they stopped us for a red light. I 
wanted to get my hands on Bill Bonnell. 
"Q. It wasn't because you were guilty, was it? 
"A. Because I wanted to get my hands on Bill Bonnell because 
I suspected he was trying . . . 
"Q. Why didn't you tell the police that Bill Bonnell just set 
you up? 
"A. Because I would rather have my own hands on him. 
"Q. When Mr. Beamer arrived? 
"A. . . . [W]hen Mr. Beamer got there I said to Mr. Beamer what 
the hell is all this about and he said you are under arrest for the 
suspicion of selling marijuana and I said you got to be crazy. I 
was pretty upset. 
"Q. So on the night of April 29 you felt that you were being 
framed like you are being framed today? 
"A. I was so confused that night, the night of the arrest. 
"Q. How about Mr. Wood? 
"A. Mr. Wood didn't know what was going on. 
"Q. . . . Are you as mad and upset today as you were that 
night? 
"A. I can't answer that question. 
"Q. Did you feel the same way about what happened to you? 
"A. That night I felt like I couldn't believe what was happening. 
"Q. You didn't like being framed? 
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Court's presumption that the defendants' silence was the 
product of reliance on the Miranda warning, the Court's 
entire due process rationale collapses. For without re-
"A. That is right. I didn't like some one putting me in a spot 
like that. 
"Q. Didn't it occur to you to try to protect yourself? 
"A. Yes, at this time I felt like I wasn't talking to nobody but 
John James who was the attorney at that time. 
"Q. But you felt . . . 
"A. The man walked up and didn't ask me anything. 
"Q. You didn't talk to a soul about how rotten it was because 
you were framed? 
"A. I will answer the question, sir, the best I can. I didn't 
know what to say. I was stunned about what was going on and I 
was asked questions and I answered the questions as simply as I 
could because I didn't have nobody there to help me answer the 
questions. 
"Q. Wouldn't that have been a marvelous time to protest your 
innocence? 
"A. I don't know if it would or not. 
"Q. Do you remember having a conversation with Kenneth 
Beamer? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. What was said? 
"A. Kenneth Beamer said I want to know where you stash— 
where your hide out is, where you are keeping the dope and I 
said I don't know what you are talking about. I believe the 
question was asked in front of you. 
"Q. Where did this conversation take place? 
"A. Took place during the search. 
"Q. So any way you didn't tell anyone how angry you were that 
night? 
"A. I was very angry. 
"Q. But you didn't tell anyone? 
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liance on the waiver, the case is no different than if no 
warning had been given, and nothing in the Court's 
opinion suggests that there would be any unfairness in 
"A. That is right. If I started I don't know where I would 
have stopped. I was upset." Wood Tr. 424-430. 
Petitioner Wood testified on cross-examination at his trial as 
follows: 
"Q. [By the prosecutor.] Jefferson Doyle said he was confused, 
angry and upset [at the time of the arrest]. Were you confused, 
angry and upset? 
"A. [By Wood.] Upset and confused. 
"Q. Why were you upset? 
"A. Because I didn't know what was going on most of the time. 
"Q. Why would you be upset? Because you found $1,300 in 
your back seat? 
"A. Mainly because the person that was in the car JefT [Doyle] 
was upset confused and angry and . . . 
"Q. What has that to do with you? 
"A. I am in the car. That is what it has to do with me. 
"Q. You are innocent? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Of anything? 
"A. I don't know about anything. 
"Q. This particular incident, you were placed under arrest, 
weren't you? 
"A. Yes, innocent of this incident. 
"Q. Innocent of the entire transaction? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Or even any knowledge of the entire transaction? 
"A. Up to a point, sir. 
"Q. Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with this and you 
are innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived on the scene why didn't 
you tell him? 
"A. Mr. Cunningham, in the last eight months to a year there 
has been so many implications, etc. in the paper and law enforce-
ment that are setting people up and busting them for narcotics and 
stuff." Wood Tr. 467-469. 
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using petitioners' prior inconsistent silence for impeach-
ment purposes in such a case. 
Indeed, as a general proposition, if we assume the 
defendant's silence would be admissible for impeach-
ment purposes if no Miranda warning had been given, 
I should think that the warning would have a tendency 
to salvage the defendant's credibility as a witness. If 
the defendant is a truthful witness, and if his silence 
is the consequence of his understanding of the Miranda 
warning, he may explain that fact when he is on the 
stand. Even if he is untruthful, the availability of 
that explanation puts him in a better position than if 
he had received no warning. In my judgment, the risk 
that a truthful defendant will be deceived by the Mi-
randa warning and also will be unable to explain his 
honest misunderstanding is so much less than the risk 
that exclusion of the evidence will merely provide a 
shield for perjury that I cannot accept the Court's due 
process rationale. 
Accordingly, if we assume that the use of a defend-
ant's silence for impeachment purposes would be other-
wise unobjectionable, I find no merit in the notion that 
he is denied due process of law because he received a 
Miranda warning. 
I I 
Petitioners argue that the State violated their Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by ask-
ing the jury to draw an inference of guilt from their 
constitutionally protected silence. They challenge both 
the prosecutor's cross-examination and his closing 
argument. 
A 
Petitioners claim that the cross-examination was im-
proper because it referred to their silence at the time of 
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their arrest, to their failure to testify at the preliminary 
hearing, and to their failure to reveal the "frame" prior 
to trial. Their claim applies to the testimony of 
each defendant at his own trial, and also to the testi-
mony each gave as a witness at the trial of the other. 
Since I think it quite clear that a defendant may not 
object to the violation of another person's privilege,5 I 
shall only discuss the argument that a defendant may not 
be cross-examined about his own prior inconsistent 
silence. 
In support of their objections to the cross-examination 
about their silence at the time of arrest, petitioners pri-
marily rely on the statement in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U. S. 436, that the prosecution may not use at trial the 
fact that the defendant stood mute or claimed the priv-
ilege in the face of accusations during custodial interro-
gation.6 There are two reasons why that statement does 
not adequately support petitioners' argument. 
First, it is not accurate to say that the petitioners 
"stood mute or claimed the privilege in the face of ac-
cusations." Neither petitioner claimed the privilege and 
5
 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 206-207; 8 J. Wig-
more, Evidence §2270, pp. 416-417 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 
cf. Alderman v.JJnited States, 394 U. S. 165, 174. Cross-examina-
tion and comment upon a witness' prior silence does not raise any 
inference prejudicial to the defendant, and indeed, does not even 
raise any inference that the defendant remained silent. 
G
 "In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to 
penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
when he is under police custodial interrogation The prosecution 
may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or 
claimed his privilege in the face of accusation. Cf. Griffin v. Cali-
fornia, 380 U. S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 8 
(1964); Comment, 31 U. Chi L. Rev. 556 (1964); Developments 
in the Law—Confessions, 79 Ilarv. L. Rev. 935, 1041-1044 (1966). 
See also Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 562 (1897)." 
384 U. S., at 468 n. 37. 
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petitioner Doyle did not even remain silent.7 The case 
is not one in which a description of the actual conversa-
tion between the defendants and the police would give 
rise to any inference of guilt if it were not so flagrantly 
inconsistent with their trial testimony. Rather than a 
claim of privilege, we simply have a failure to advise the 
police of a "frame" at a time when it most surely would 
have been mentioned if petitioners' trial testimony were 
true. That failure gave rise to an inference of guilt only 
because it belied their trial testimony. 
Second, the dictum in the footnote in Miranda relies 
primarily upon Griffin v. California, 380 IT. S. 609, which 
held that the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated in the 
Fourteenth, prohibited the prosecution's use of the de-
fendant's silence in its case in chief. But as long ago as 
Raff el v. United States, 271 U. S. 494, this Court recog-
nized the distinction between the prosecution's affirm-
ative use of the defendant's prior silence and the use of 
prior silence for impeachment purposes. Raff el expressly 
held that the defendant's silence at a prior trial was ad-
missible for purposes of impeachment despite the ap-
plication in federal prosecutions of the prohibition that 
Griffin found in the Fifth Amendment. Raff el, supra, at 
496-497. 
Moreover, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the author of the 
Court's opinion in Miranda, joined the opinion in Wal-
der v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, which squarely held 
that a valid constitutional objection to the admissibility 
of evidence as part of the Government's case in chief did 
not bar the use of that evidence to impeach the defend-
ant's trial testimony. The availability of an objection to 
the affirmative use of improper evidence does not provide 
the defendant "with a shield against contradiction of his 
untruths." Id., at 65. The need to ensure the integrity 
7
 See n, 4, supra. 
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of the truth-determining function of the adversary trial 
process lias provided the predicate for an unbroken line 
of decisions so holding.8 
8
 As the Court recently recognized in a most carefully considered 
opinion, an adversary system can maintain neither the reality nor 
the appearance of efficacy without the assurance that its judgments 
rest upon a complete illumination of a case rather than upon "a 
partial or speculative presentation of the facts." United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 709. The necessity of insuring a complete 
presentation of all relevant evidence ha.s led to the rule that a 
criminal defendant who voluntarily forgoes his privilege not to 
testify, and presents exculpatory or mitigating evidence, thereby 
subjects himself to relevant cross-examination without the right to 
reclaim Fifth Amendment protection on a selective basis. Fitz-
patrick v. United States, 178 U. S. 304, 315. 
"If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility 
may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other 
witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope 
of relevant cross-examination. '[7J]° has no right to set forth to 
the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself 
open to a cross-examination upon those facts.' " Brown v. United 
States, 356 U. S. 148, 154-155 (citation omitted). 
One need not impute perjury to an entiro class to acknowledge 
that a testifying defendant has more to gain and less to lose than 
an ordinary witness from fabrications upon the witness stand. Cf. 
Reagan v. United States, 157 U. S. 301, 304-311; Taylor v. United 
States, 390 F. 2d 278, 284-285 (CA8 1968) (Blackmun, J.) . 
As the Court notes today: "Unless prosecutors are allowed wide lee-
way in the scope of impeachment cross-examination some defendants 
would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function of a trial by 
presenting tailored defenses insulated from effective challenge." 
Ante, at 617 n. 7. In recognition of this fact, this Court has allowed 
evidence to be used for impeachment purposes that would be inad-
missible as evidence of guilt. In Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 
62, evidence of narcotics unlawfully seized in connection with an 
aborted earlier case against a defendant was held admissible for the 
limited purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony that he 
never had been associated with narcotics, although such evidence 
clearly was inadmissible for any purpose in the prosecution's case in 
chief. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, the Court held admis-
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Although I have no doubt concerning the propriety 
of the cross-examination about petitioners' failure to 
mention the purported "frame" at the time of their ar-
rest, a more difficult question is presented by their objec-
tion to the questioning about their failure to testify at 
the preliminary hearing and their failure generally to 
mention the "frame" before trial.9 Unlike the failure 
sible for the purpose of impeaching a defendant's testimony certain 
partially inconsistent post-arrest statements which, although volun-
tary, were unavailable for the prosecution's case because they had 
been given by the defendant without benefit of Miranda warnings. 
And last Term, in a decision closely analogous to Harris, the Court 
held admissible for impeachment purposes post-arrest statements of a 
defendant made after he had received Miranda warnings and exer-
cised his right to request a lawyer, but before he had been furnished 
with counsel as Miranda requires in such circumstances. Oregon v. 
Hass, 420 U. S. 714. 
In each of these cases involving impeachment cross-examination, 
the need to insure the integrity of the trial by the "traditional 
truth-testing devices of the adversary process," Harris v. New York, 
supra, at 225, was deemed to outweigh the policies underlying the 
relevant exclusionary rules. 
9
 Petitioner Doyle was cross-examined as follows at his trial: 
"Q. [By the prosecutor.] All right. Do you remember the 
Preliminary Hearing in this case? 
"A. [By Doyle.] Yes Sir. I remember it. 
"Q. And that was prior to your indictment for this offense, was 
it not? 
"A. Yes sir. I believe,—Yes Sir, it was before I was indicted. 
"Q. Arraignment. Is that what you mean? 
"A. Yes. The next day after the arrest. 
"Q. Yes, when evidence was presented and you had the oppor-
tunity to hear the testimony of the witnesses against you. Remem-
ber that? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. Mr. Bonnell testified; Captain Griffin testified; Deputy— 
Chief Deputy White testified? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. Kenneth Beamer testified? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
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to make the kind of spontaneous comment that discovery 
of a "frame" would be expected to prompt, there is no 
significant inconsistency between petitioners' trial testi-
"Q. You were there, weren't you? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. And your lawyer was there,—Mr. James? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. Tape recording was made of the transcript? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. Did you protest your innocence at that proceeding? 
"A. I didn't—everything that was done with that was done with 
my attorney. My attorney did it. 
"Q. All right. The first time that you gave this version of 
the fact was in the trial of Richard Wood,—was it not? 
"A. Yes Sir. I t was the first time I was asked. 
"Q. All the time, you being innocent? 
"A. Yes Sir." Doyle Tr. 507-508. 
Petitioner Wood was subjected to similar cross-examination at 
his trial: 
"Q. [By the prosecutor.] As a matter of fact you never told 
anyone that you had been set up until today? 
"A. [By Wood.] Yes, I believe I did, sir. 
"Q. I assume you discussed it with your lawyer? 
"A. Yes, I discussed it with my lawyer. 
"Q. And you heard the testimony and witnesses against you? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And wero you aware Mr. James was able to obtain a tape 
transcript of the proceedings? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you no doubt listened to those? 
"A. Parts and portions of them—some of it. 
"Q. But you never communicated your innocenoe? 
"A. I believe I did one time to Mr. Beamer. 
"Q. When might that have been? 
"A. When in the jail house. 
"Q. So you protested your innocence? 
"A. In a little room. I believe he asked us how do you let 
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mony and their adherence to counsel's advice not to take 
the stand at the preliminary hearing; moreover, the de-
cision not to divulge their defense prior to trial is prob-
ably attributable to counsel rather than to petitioners.10 
Nevertheless, unless and until this Court overrules Raff el 
v. United States, 271 U. S. 494/1 I think a state court is 
people get away with people setting up friends like this. He said 
Bill Bonnell is not your friend and I said no, but I figured he was 
a good enough acquaintance ho would do that. 
"Q. Where was that? 
"A. Little room there. 
"Q. Ever been there before? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. When? 
"Q. Did you see me there? 
"A. I didn't know who you were at the time. I believe you 
were in and out of there. 
"Q. You didn't say anything to me, did you? 
"A. No, I didn't know who you were then." Wood Tr. 470-472. 
10
 Under Ohio law, the preliminary hearing determines only 
whether the defendant should be held for trial. The prosecution 
need establish, at most, that a crime has been committed and that 
there is "probable and reasonable cause" to hold the defendant 
for trial, and the court need only find "substantial credible evidence" 
of the charge against the defendant. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§§2937.12, 2937.13 (Supp. 1973). Indeed, if a defendant has been 
indicted, no hearing need be held. State v. Morris, 42 Ohio St. 2d 
307, 326, 329 N. E. 2d 85, 97 (1975). Defense counsel thus will have 
no incentive to divulge the defendant's case at the preliminary hear-
ing if the prosecution has presented substantial evidence of guilt. 
Since that was the case here, no significant impeaching inference may 
be drawn from petitioners' silence at that proceeding. 
Petitioners' failure to refer to the "frame" at any time between 
arrest and trial is somewhat more probative; for if the "frame" 
story were true, one would have expected counsel to try to per-
suade the prosecution to dismiss the charges in advance of trial. 
11
 Raffel was the last decision of this Court to address the con-
stitutionality of admitting evidence of a defendant's prior silence 
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free to regard the defendant's decision to take the stand 
as a waiver of his objection to the use of his failure to 
testify at an earlier proceeding or his failure to offer his 
version of the events prior to trial. 
B 
In my judgment portions of the prosecutor's argument 
to the jury overstepped permissible bounds. In each trial, 
he commented upon the defendant's silence not only as 
inconsistent with his testimony that he had been "framed/' 
to impeach his testimony upon direct examination. Raffel had been 
charged with conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. 
An agent testified at his first trial that he had admitted ownership 
of a drinking place; Raffel did not take the stand. The trial ended 
in a hung jury, and upon retrial, the agent testified as before. 
Raffel elected to testify and denied making the statement, but he 
was cross-examined on his failure to testify in the first trial. This 
Court held that the evidence was admissible because Raffel had 
completely waived the privilege against self-incrimination by decid-
ing to testify. 271 U. S., at 499. 
Subsequent cases, decided in the exercise of this Court's supervisory 
powers, have diminished the force of Raj]el in the federal courts. 
United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171; Stewart v. United States, 366 
U. S. 1; Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391. All three of 
these cases held that the defendant's prior silence or prior claim 
of the privilege was inadmissible for purposes of impeachment; all 
three distinguished Raffel on the ground that the Court there 
assumed that the defendant's prior silence was significantly incon-
sistent with his testimony on direct examination. Hale, supra, at 
175-176; Stewart, supra, at 5-7; Grunewald, supra, at 418-424. 
Two of the three cases relied upon the need to protect the defend-
ant's exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination from un-
warranted inferences of guilt, a rationale that is not easily recon-
ciled with the reasoning in Raffel that the decision to testify 
constitutes a complete waiver of the protection afforded by the 
privilege. Compare Hale, supra, at 180 and n. 7, and Grunewald, 
supra, at 423-424, with Raffel, 271 U. S., at 499. 
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but also as inconsistent with the defendant's innocence.12 
Comment on the lack of credibility of the defendant is 
plainly proper; it is not proper, however, for the prosecu-
12
 At Doyle's trial, the prosecutor made the following arguments 
to the jury: 
"Diffuse what the true facts are; obscure the facts and prosecute 
the prosecution. 
"A typical and classic defense, but keep in mind, when you are 
considering the testimony of the law enforcement officers involved, 
that not until, Ladies and Gentlemen, not until the trial of this 
case and prior to this case, the trial of Richard Wood's case, that 
anybody connected with the prosecution in this case had any idea 
what stories would be told by Jefferson Doyle and Richard Wood. 
Not the foggiest idea. Both of them told you on the witness stand 
that neither one of them said a word to the law enforcement offi-
cials on the scene— 
"(continuing) on the scene at the point of their arrest, at the 
Preliminary Hearing before Indictment in this case. Not a word 
that they were innocent; that this was their position; that some-
how, they had been 'set-up.' 
"So, when you evaluate the testimony of the Law Enforcement 
Officials, consider— 
"(continuing)—what they had to deal with on the night in ques-
tion and the months subsequent to that. 
"Then they decide that they have been 'had' somehow. They 
have been framed. 
"Now, remember, this fits with the facts as observed by the law 
enforcement officers except the basic, crucial facts. Somehow, they 
have been framed. So, if you can believe this, Ladies and Gentle-
men, they take off, chase Bill Bonnell around to give his money back 
to him or ask him what he did to them, yet they don't bother to 
tell the Law Enforcement Officers. 
"It is unbelievable. I think, when you go to the Jury Room, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, you are going to decide what really happened. 
"We have the Fifth Amendment. I agree with it. I t is funda-
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tor to ask the jury to draw a direct inference of guilt 
from silence—to argue, in effect, that silence is inconsis-
tent with innocence. But since the two inferences—per-
mental to our sense and system of fairness, but if you are 
innocent— 
"(continuing)—if you are innocent, Ladies and Gentlemen, if you 
have been framed, if you have been set-on, etc. etc. etc., as we 
heard in Court these last days, you don't say, when the law en-
forcement officer says,—'You are under arrest,'—you don't say,—T 
don't know what you are talking about.' You tell the truth. You 
tell them what happened and you go from there. You don't say,— 
T don't know what you are talking about,'— and demand to see 
your lawyer and refuse to permit a search of your vehicle, forcing 
the law enforcement agents to get a search warrant. 
"If you're innocent, you just don't do it." Doyle Tr. 515-516, 
519, 526. 
At Wood's trial, ho made similar arguments: 
"The defense in this case was very careful to make no state-
ments at all until they had the benefit of hearing all the evidence 
against them and had time to ascertain what they would admit and 
what they would deny and how they could fit their version of the 
story with the state's case. During none of this time did we ever 
hear any business about a set up or frame or anything else. All 
right. 
"Yes, it is the law of our land, and rightfully so, ladies and 
gentlemen, that nobody must be compelled to incriminate them-
selves. It is the 5th Amendment. No one can be forced to give 
testimony against themselves where criminal action charges are 
pending. It is a very fundamental right and I am glad we have it. 
"The idea was nobody can convict himself out of his own mouth 
and it grew out of the days when they used to whip and beat and 
extract statements from the defendants and get them to convict 
themselves out of their own mouth, and I am glad we have that 
right. 
"But ladies and gentlemen, there is one statement I am going to 
make. If you are innocent, if you are innocent, if you have been 
framed, if you have been set up as claimed in this case, when do 
you tell it? When do you tell the policemen that? 
"Think about it. After months—after various proceedings and 
636 OCTOBER TERM, 1975 
STEVENS, J., dissenting 426 U. S. 
jury and guilt—are inextricably intertwined because they 
have a common source, it would be unrealistic to permit 
comment on the former but to find reversible error in 
the slightest reference to the latter. In the context 
of the entire argument and the entire trial, I am not 
persuaded that the rather sophisticated distinction be-
tween permissible comment on credibility and impermis-
sible comment on an inference of guilt justifies a reversal 
of these state convictions.13 
Accordingly, although I have some doubt concerning 
the propriety of the cross-examination about the pre-
liminary hearing and consider a portion of the closing 
argument improper, I would affirm these convictions. 
for the first time? I am not going to say any more about that 
but I want you to think about it." Closing Argument of the Prose-
cutor 12-14, supplementing Wood Tr. 
13
 Petitioner Doyle also argues that he was erroneously cross-
examined at his trial on his failure to consent to a search of the 
car he was driving at the time of the arrest. Petitioner Wood 
appears to raise the similar claim that testimony of other witnesses 
that he failed to consent to a search of the car was erroneously 
admitted at his trial. The parties have not argued these issues 
separately from the questions whether prior silence in various cir-
cumstances may be admitted to impeach a defendant or a defense 
witness. I t is apparent, however, that these questions implicate 
Fourth Amendment issues that merit independent examination. 
Accordingly, like the Court, I do not address them. 
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Respondent was indicted for first-degree murder, but by agreement 
with the prosecution and on counsel's advice respondent pleaded 
guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced. Subsequently, 
after exhausting his state remedies in an unsuccessful attempt 
to have his conviction vacated on the ground that his guilty plea 
was involuntary, respondent filed a habeas corpus petition in 
Federal District Court, alleging that his guilty plea was involun-
tary because, inter alia, he was not aware that intent to cause 
death was an element of second-degree murder. The District 
Court ultimately heard the testimony of several witnesses, in-
cluding respondent and his defense counsel in the original prosecu-
tion; and the transcript of the relevant state-court proceedings and 
certain psychological evaluations of respondent, who was substan-
tially below average intelligence, were made part of the record. 
On the basis of the evidence thus developed the District Court 
found that respondent had not been advised by counsel or the 
state court that an intent to cause death was an essential element 
of second-degree murder, and, based on this finding, held that the 
guilty plea was involuntary and had to be set aside. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed. Held: Since respondent did not receive ade-
quate notice of the offense to which he pleaded guilty, his plea 
was involuntary and the judgment of conviction was entered with-
out due process of law. The plea could not be voluntary in the 
sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he com-
mitted the offense unless respondent received "real notice of the 
true nature of the charge against him, the first and most uni-
versally recognized requirement of due process/' Smith v. 
O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329, 334. Where the record discloses that 
defense counsel did not purport to stipulate that respondent had 
the requisite intent or explain to him that his plea would be 
admission of that fact, and he made no factual statement or ad-
mission necessarily implying that he had such intent, it is im-
